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Abstract
Nearly 25 years after the German reunification, vastly diﬀerent living conditions between
East and West Germany still remain. This is particularly true for the distribution of net
wealth which is of special importance for the well-being of individuals. Wealth provides
utility in a number of ways, for instance, by acting as a buﬀer against negative income
shocks. Using the wealth component of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), we
find that, on average, members of western households exhibit a net worth more than twice
as high as their eastern counterparts. This wealth gap remains roughly stable over time and
is much more pronounced for upper parts of the distributions.
In this paper, we analyze how much of this gap in per capita net wealth at diﬀerent parts of
the distribution can be attributed to observable factors such as permanent income or socio-
demographic characteristics. We carry out our decomposition analysis via a reweighting
approach. We find that for the lower part of the distribution, most of the gap can be
attributed to the wealth determinants, while this share is much lower at the upper part.
The most important contributing factors in this regard are the lower levels of income still
prevailing in East Germany as well as diﬀerentials in labor market outcomes. Moreover,
Germans in younger cohorts feature more similar levels of wealth and are more similar than
the older generation. For them the success on the labor market is by far the most important
factor. We also find that home ownership rates diﬀer markedly between the two regions and
play an important role for the wealth gap even though diﬀerences in housing prices also seem
matter.
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1 Introduction
The 9th November 1989 went down as a watershed event in the history of Germany. After
40 years of separate statehood following the Second World War, the fall of the Berlin Wall,
the symbol of separation between East and West Germany, ushered in a new era. The chain
of events following this date culminated about one year later, on 3rd October 1990, in the
German reunification, when the former communist German Democratic Republic (GDR) joined
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in German unity. The expressed goal of politicians
at the time was to rapidly bring living standards for citizens of the former GDR on par with
their western compatriots (in this context, chancellor Kohl expressed his now famous vision of
impending ”blooming landscapes” in East Germany). However, even today, after nearly 25 years
of German unity, vast diﬀerences in terms of economic well-being remains a reality between the
two parts of the country. While diﬀerentials in wages, household incomes or unemployment rates
between both parts of Germany have been studied fairly well (see, for instance Biewen 2001,
Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln, Krueger and Sommer 2010), the analysis of diﬀerences in wealth levels is still at
its beginning. The main reason for this situation is the usually more problematic data collection
process for personal wealth compared to other measures of economic well-being. Respondents
are often unwilling to give a detailed account of their wealth situation or are simply not able
to assess it accurately. As Davies and Shorrocks (2000) point out, household surveys are less
reliable for questions on wealth than for those concerning income. Nevertheless, several recent
studies have been looking into the distribution of wealth for Germany, at least on a descriptive
level (Hauser 2010, Frick and Grabka 2010, Grabka 2014).
Why does the asset situation of Germans matter in the first place? If one is interested in the
overall well-being of a group of people, assessing their financial situation is of key importance.
Wealth provides utility for members of a household in a number of diﬀerent ways:1 First of all,
wealth can yield income streams through interest or dividends on capital investments. It can also
provide direct utility - for instance, through owner-occupied housing. Moreover, precautionary
wealth can ensure financial stability by serving as a buﬀer against idiosyncratic risks such as
1See, for instance, Grabka and Frick (2007) and Frick and Grabka (2010).
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negative income shocks. In addition, a person can achieve a high social status as well as economic
and political power by accumulating wealth. Finally, a high net worth enables one to care for
one’s children via gifts or bequests.
Against this backdrop it is important to assess the factors that contribute to the still prevail-
ing diﬀerences in wealth levels and wealth inequality between East and West Germany.2 There
are several institutional reasons that can explain the lower levels of wealth in East Germany
today.3 Probably the most important factor is the strongly restricted opportunity for wealth
accumulation in the former GDR. Namely, private ownership of business assets and real estate
wealth were largely prohibited. Thus, only few eastern households owned these kinds of assets
at the time of reunification. Furthermore, while wages and pension payments where converted
to Deutsche Mark (DM) on a one-to-one basis, this was not true for notable financial wealth.4
Once households where legally able to acquire ownership on named assets, it was often not
feasible for them to do so due to the quickly deteriorating financial situation of many eastern
households in the face of mass unemployment and starkly declining wage levels. A more subtle
point in this context is the social learning process. Children acquire attitudes towards saving
behavior and the ownership of certain assets in large parts from their parents. This might have
helped to perpetuate negative attitudes towards wealth accumulation in the former GDR. It is
therefore of interest how these very diﬀerent surrounding conditions continue to shape the levels
of wealth accumulation in these two regions today.
With this in mind, an important question is how much of the observed wealth diﬀerence
between the two parts of Germany can be explained by observable diﬀerences in factors that are
associated with higher wealth levels such as income, educational attainment and age. Previous
studies tried to decompose diﬀerences in wealth levels between certain groups. For instance,
Cobb-Clark and Hildebrand (2006) and Bauer, Cobb-Clark, Hildebrand and Sinning (2011) look
into the determinants of the wealth gap between the native population and immigrants in the
2Grabka (2014) discusses this wealth gap as part of a special issue of the DIW Wochenbericht series on the
socio-economic reality in Germany 25 years after the fall of the Berlin wall.
3See Hauser (2010), Frick, Grabka and Hauser (2010) and Frick and Grabka (2010) for more background
information.
4Financial wealth of more than 6,000 DM where converted on a two-to-one basis only.
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United States and Germany, respectively. Both studies find that the adverse financial situation
of immigrant households, compared to native households, can in large parts be explained by
their unfavorable socio-demographic make-up. Specifically, migrant households are on average
younger and less educated compared to native households in these countries. Sierminska, Frick
and Grabka (2010) assess the diﬀerence in personal wealth between men and women in Germany.
They find that the on average lower wealth levels of females are largely determined by their lower
levels of income and labor market experience. In the following we try to decompose the wealth
gap between East and West German households in a similar fashion.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe key aspects of the
wealth distribution in Germany as well as the findings of previous research of the wealth situation
of individuals and households in East and West Germany since reunification. Summary statistics
for per captia net wealth and potential wealth determinants in our sample are presented in
Section 3. Next, Section 4 covers the foundations of our decomposition method via a reweighting
approach. In Section 5 we present the empirical results of our decomposition analyses. Finally,
Section 6 concludes.
2 Wealth in Germany
In order to analyze the wealth gap between East and West Germany, we first have to define what
we mean by ”wealth”. First of all, it is decisive whether one is interested in the wealth positions
of individuals or households. Most surveys ask for information on asset and debt positions only
on the household level. Consequently, most studies focus on household wealth. However, even
if data on personal wealth is available, it is unclear how to disentangle the wealth position of
individual household members as they are unlikely to take financial decisions independently of
each other. Frick and Grabka (2010) touch upon this problem by stressing that it comes down
to how one sees the implicit redistribution within a household. If one focuses on individual
wealth, one makes the implicit assumption that redistribution does not occur on the household
level. Looking at the average wealth in a household, on the other hand, implies that personal
wealth is completely redistributed on the household level. Thus, the former type of analysis will
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typically unveil higher levels of wealth inequality compared to the latter one. In reality, the true
level of redistribution between household members will likely lie somewhere in-between these two
extremes. Here, we will focus on per capita net wealth as this is the more conservative measure
and we believe it to be the more meaningful level of observation for this type of analysis.
Usually wealth studies concentrate on disposable wealth which Davies and Shorrocks (2000)
define as nonhuman wealth minus debt. Human capital arguably constitutes the largest fraction
of wealth for many individuals, especially for younger ones. However, it is notoriously hard to
measure with any degree of accuracy. Thus, human capital is generally excluded from the defi-
nition of wealth. A similar argument applies to the expected value of vested pension rights and
other social security wealth. In a country with a generous welfare state, such as Germany, these
entitlements probably make up a large part of the wealth of a typical households. At the same
time, the cash value of future entitlements is aﬄicted by uncertainty with respect to appropriate
discount rates, risk adjustment factors and the like. For this reason, most wealth surveys do not
ask for these wealth positions.5 Another point in this regard is that the aforementioned benefits
provided by wealth do not apply to human capital and social security wealth in the same way
as for financial and housing wealth. The reason for looking at wealth net of debts is that it is
more informative of the well-being of household members compared to gross wealth. Consider,
for example, gross housing wealth which would portray the financial situation of a person too
positive if one did not take into account the mortgage debt that usually accompanies such an
investment.
In order to analyze the wealth gap in a sensible fashion, one must first have a solid under-
standing of the key properties of such a distribution. Both Davies and Shorrocks (2000) and
Jenkins and Jantti (2005) provide a good summary of the stylized facts of wealth distributions.
First of all, the distribution of net wealth is generally much more unequal than the distribution
of income.6 For most people, wealth is the result of an accumulation process of income streams
5In Frick and Grabka (2010) an attempt is made to estimate the impact of entitlements to government transfers
on the distribution of wealth in Germany. They find that accounting for these claims lowers the inequality by
about 20 % as they are very evenly distributed across the population.
6In Germany wealth inequality, as measured by the Gini coeﬃcient, is about double as high as income inequality
(see Hauser and Stein 2006).
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over time. Thus, the prevailing income inequalities are also added up and intensified so that
the resulting wealth distribution is much more spread out. Moreover, the distribution of wealth
is typically right skewed with a very fat right tail. Because a few individuals own a dispropor-
tionally large fraction of the total wealth, one often talks of a ”parade of the dwarves” in this
context. Thus, leaving out such households simply due to sample variation can significantly
eﬀect the sample composition with respect to the distribution of wealth. Hence, it is important
to oversample rich households in surveys on household wealth. Furthermore, financial wealth is
usually much more unequally distributed compared to non-financial assets - at least if owner-
occupied housing constitutes a significant fraction of wealth. Finally, many household members
never accumulate much wealth so that one usually observes a high number of households with
non-positive net wealth. Specifically, most wealth distributions feature a pronounced mass-point
at zero net wealth as a large fraction of households report exactly zero net worth.
As Jenkins and Jantti (2005) point out, these stylized facts have important implications
for the modeling of the wealth distribution. First of all, it should be obvious that the mean is
generally not a very informative moment for such a spread-out and skewed distribution. Thus, it
is not suﬃcient to estimate only the mean wealth diﬀerence, for instance via an Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition. To get a more complete picture of the wealth gap, one should investigate diﬀerent
parts of the distribution - e.g. by looking at several quantiles such as the median. Additionally,
the high number of households with zero or negative net wealth suggests looking at the proportion
of household members with non-positive wealth levels. The often found spike-at-zero means that
smoothing techniques, like kernel-density estimation, are usually not feasible. In Section 4 we
will lay out how one can analyze the wealth gap along the entire distribution taking into account
the peculiarities of the wealth distribution.
2.1 EVS
Early studies on the distribution of private wealth in Germany mainly relied on the Income and
Expenditure Survey (Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe: EVS) a microcensus of 1 % of
the German population surveyed every five years since 1964 by the Federal Statistical Oﬃce
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of Germany. One of the first studies looking into the financial and asset situation of German
households in detail is Bo¨rsch-Supan and Eymann (2002). The authors focus on the composition
of household portfolios for the time period from the 1970s to the mid 1990s. When comparing
the situation for East and West Germany, Bo¨rsch-Supan and Eymann (2002) use the 1993 wave
of the EVS. They find that households in East Germany posses much lower levels of wealth
compared to those in the West and that it is distributed more unevenly. They speculate that
part of this higher inequality might be due to a small group of profiteers of the transition process.
The authors also highlight that the wealth distribution of the youngest cohort in the sample
is much more similar between the two regions which might reflect the diﬀerent opportunities
to accumulate wealth before reunification. Moreover, the average portfolio composition diﬀers
widely between the two regions: on average, eastern portfolios are much less diversified than
their western counterparts, feature almost twice the share of wealth in safe assets (43 % to 22
%) and are much less likely to contain real estate (28 % to 51 %).
Hauser (2010)7 uses the EVS to compare the wealth of households in East and West Germany
in the time directly following reunification from 1993 to 2003.8 He finds a trend of convergence
between East and West Germany in terms of inequality and level of disposable household wealth
for this time period. Nonetheless, households in the eastern part of reunified Germany lag their
western counterparts considerably in both income and wealth levels. In 1993 the net worth
of an average household in the East was 36,400 e while this figure was 125,400 e for the
West. Thus the average eastern household commanded only about 29 % of the wealth of the
average household in West Germany. Until 2003 these figures increased notably for both parts
of Germany to 59,600 e in the East and 148,800 e in the West. Thus the relative wealth level of
eastern households increased to 40 % over this time period. In the same fashion, one could see
a convergence in wealth inequality as measured by the Gini coeﬃcient. In 1993 East Germany
featured a much higher wealth inequality with a Gini coeﬃcient of 0.72 - compared to 0.63 in the
West. In 2003 these figures had aligned: while the Gini in the East declined to 0.68 it increased
7As well as Hauser and Stein (2006) and Hauser (2009).
8He also look into the data for West Germany alone prior to reunification back till 1978 but notes that the
data from those waves are not necessarily comparable.
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for the West to 0.67. Somewhat surprisingly, while the income inequality is lower in the East
than in the West, the wealth inequality is actually higher in the former GDR. Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln
et al. (2010) use the same data but also look at the financial wealth of households. They find
that inequality, as measured by the Gini coeﬃcient, increases for both net total wealth and
financial wealth over this time period and are roughly the same in 2003 (about 0.7). However,
the increase is more pronounced for net financial wealth which started from a much lower level
in 1978 (0.56 vs. 0.64).
2.2 GSOEP Wealth Module
The EVS exhibits several methodological shortcomings which makes it less than ideal for the
assessment of the wealth situation of Germans according to Frick et al. (2010) and Grabka (2014).
The main weakness of the EVS, in regard to the analysis of wealth, is that it is top-coded, i.e.
it does not contain high-income households (those with a monthly household income of 18,000
e or more). High income households are usually also the households with the highest levels of
net worth. As mentioned previously, such households make up a large fraction of the national
wealth. Thus, leaving out these households will unquestionably distort the observed wealth
distribution in the survey. Moreover, the EVS does not ask for business assets which typically
make up a large part of the wealth for high net-worth households. For both these reasons Hauser
and Stein (2006) suspect that they capture only the lower bound of the inequality and the level
of wealth in Germany.9 Finally, the EVS is not a random sample of the German population but
a quota sample which makes it harder to look more closely at certain parts of the population,
such as households in East Germany.
As of 2002 many of these issues have been addressed by the German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP), the longest running panel study of German households, which is comparable in its
design to the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the USA. The survey has been
established in 1984 as a representative sample of approximately 4,500 West German households
and was extended to East Germany shortly before reunification. It is conducted annually by
9Also, they set negative wealth levels to zero when computing the Gini coeﬃcient which further decreases the
inequality measure.
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the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) and is currently in its 30th wave. At
present it covers some 12,000 households with about 20,000 individuals. The GSOEP is the
most extensive longitudinal micro data set of its kind in Germany and covers a wide range of
socio-economic variables such as employment status, income sources, education level or attitudes
towards diﬀerent aspects of life. Since 2002 the GSOEP survey also collects data on a household’s
balance sheet in addition to its core questionnaire. Participants are asked about the amount
of money invested in five diﬀerent asset categories as well as their level of debt.10 The wealth
module is asked for every five years and currently encompasses three years (2002, 2007, 2012).
Also since 2002 high income households are being oversampled in the GSOEP which leads to a
large number of high net worth individuals in the survey. For more information on this process,
see Schupp, Frick, Goebel, Grabka, Groh-Samberg and Wagner (2009).
Since the introduction of the wealth module in the GSOEP questionnaire, the responsible
authors have published several descriptive papers outlining the wealth distribution in Germany
as well as its development over time. Mostly these studies focus on net wealth on the individual
level as the possibility to study wealth on this level is a unique element that distinguishes the
GSOEP from many other surveys on the topic. Grabka and Frick (2007) describe the main
results of the first wealth study in the 2002 wave of the GSOEP. Frick et al. (2010)11 extend the
analysis to the 2007 wealth questionnaire and focus on the change in the wealth distribution over
this time period. Furthermore, their book gives a detailed account of the wealth situation in
Germany prior to the turn of the century as well as an extensive overview of the wealth module
itself.
The work by Frick and Grabka (2010) is interesting in the context of our analysis as it also
covers the diﬀerences in the wealth distribution between East- and West Germany for 2002 and
2007. They find that in the 2002 GSOEP sample, the estimated average household wealth is
about 10,000 e higher than the equivalent amount estimated via the 2003 EVS sample. Likewise
the Gini coeﬃcient is almost 10 percentage points higher (0.76) - the same applies to the share
10More specifically the survey asks for two types of housing assets - owner-occupied and other. Moreover, the
levels of financial wealth, private insurance assets, business wealth and tangible assets are inquired. Finally, the
levels of mortgage debt and other consumer debt are verified.
11See also: Frick and Grabka (2009a) and Frick and Grabka (2009b).
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of wealth accrued by the top 10 %. More generally they find that the wealth distribution is
much more spread out than expected. Thus, they hypothesize that previous studies based on
the EVS have underestimated both the overall level of wealth as well as its concentration in the
past. This is in line with the shortcomings of the EVS mentioned above. To compare the wealth
distribution in East and West Germany, the authors resort to individual net wealth which is
much lower than household net wealth and even more unequally distributed. Looking at per
capita net wealth, the authors find that the average per capita net wealth in the West in the
2002 GSOEP sample is about 10 % lower than in the 2003 EVS sample. At the same time the
EVS sample features an 18 % higher average wealth level for East Germany compared to the
GSOEP. Thus, the wealth gap between the two countries is larger than previously thought.
Finally, Grabka and Westermeier (2014) look into the change of the distribution over all
three sample years. They find that the overall structure of the wealth distribution in Germany
remains largely unchanged between 2002 and 2012. The same holds true for the wealth gap
between East and West Germany. For instance the share of average individual net wealth in the
East compared to the West is 41 % (90,000 e to 36,700 e) in 2002 and increases only marginally
to 44 % (94,000 e to 41,000 e) until 2012. Also the Gini coeﬃcient is about four percentage
points higher in the former GDR over this period of time. Hence, there does not seem to be a
narrowing of the wealth gap between East and West Germany since the turn of the century and
the overall level of the gap has remained pronounced for more than 20 years after reunification.
3 Data
3.1 Summary Statistics for Net Wealth
In the following we start our analysis by looking at the descriptive distribution of wealth in the
three available wealth modules in 2002, 2007 and 2012. Our sample consists of roughly 20,000
adults per year (about 22,000, 20,000 and 18,000, respectively) of which about a fifth lives in
East Germany. Table 1 illustrates the distribution of per capita net wealth for Germany as a
whole over these years.
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We find, in line with the results by Grabka and Westermeier (2014) on individual wealth,
that the structure of the wealth distribution remains largely unchanged over the observed time
period. Most statistical measures change only modestly from 2002 to 2012. It is striking, that
for the lower part of the distribution up to the 30 % quantile we see a trend of decreasing or
at least stagnating wealth levels. Starting from the 40 % quantile, we see a modest increase in
the average net worth per household over time. Even though these contrasting developments
in the lower and upper parts of the distribution suggest an increase in inequality over time,
this is not reflected in the inequality measures. The Gini coeﬃcient as well as diﬀerent quantile
ratios increase only modestly, if at all. All of this is also in line with the findings by Grabka
and Westermeier (2014). It is also noteworthy that the wealth levels decrease from 2002 to 2007
for each quantile only to surge again in 2012. As just mentioned, for quantiles above the 30 %
quantile net worth ends up even higher than in 2002. It is not clear what might have caused
this dip in 2007 as the financial crisis had not even begun at that time. Moreover, Germany did
not experience a substantial rise in home equity in the years preceding the crisis and thus there
was no potential for a strong deterioration in housing prices. The ensuing drop in the German
stock market could only aﬀect relatively few Germans as most do not participate in this asset
class.
Insert Table 1 about here.
The typical characteristics of wealth distributions, as described before, are reflected in Ta-
ble 1. Due to the stability of the distribution over the observed time periods we will focus on
the latest year in the following. In 2012 the average German holds net assets of almost 83,000
e. A person at the median, in contrast, is only worth around 31,000 e. Thus, the mean of the
distribution is more than 2.5 times higher than the median. This emphasizes the right-skewness
of the distribution. At the same time, we find that one in five people in our sample has no
or even negative net worth. About 12 % of sample population report exactly zero net assets
which is in line with the often reported spike at zero. How spread out the distribution is can be
ascertained by looking at diﬀerent quantiles and their ratios. For instance, a person at the lower
quartile owns around 2,000 e in net assets while the corresponding value for her counterpart
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at the upper quartile is about 100,000 e. The inter-quartile-ratio, therefore, is roughly 50 -
meaning the wealth of someone at the upper quartile is more than 50 times higher than for
people at the lower quartile in 2012. The wealth levels at the 90 % and 95 % quantile are about
200,000 e and 300,000 e, respectively. Thus, people in this part of the distribution own 100
times or rather 150 times the net wealth of their compatriots at the 25 % quantile. This high
level of wealth inequality is also reflected by the Gini coeﬃcient. It amounts to nearly 72 % for
per capita net wealth while the corresponding value for per capita net income is only around
27 %. However, as expected, we find that per capita net wealth is still more evenly distributed
compared to individual net wealth as reported by Grabka and Westermeier (2014). Nonetheless,
they note that Germany, along with Austria, is the most unequal economy in this regard in the
euro area.
We are chiefly interested in the diﬀerence between the wealth distributions in East and West
Germany. For this purpose, Table 2 exhibits distributional measures of the per capita net wealth
in both regions. The evolution of the wealth levels for the two regions largely follows that of
Germany as a whole, albeit on very diﬀerent levels. Over the observed time period, both East
and West Germany exhibit mostly declining or stagnating wealth levels below the 30 % quantile
of the distribution. Thus, many low net worth households in both parts of the country are
actually worse of in 2012 compared to 2002. At the same time net wealth increase modestly for
most of the upper part of the wealth distribution. Nevertheless, this increase in spread is rather
modest and the general shape of the distributions remains largely unchanged as recognized by
Grabka and Westermeier (2014).
Insert Table 2 about here.
Looking at the mean net wealth, we see that the average household member in West Germany
in 2002 was on average worth 87,427 e. Until 2012 this amount had increased to 94,088 e. For
the East the corresponding numbers are 36,703 e and 41,105 e, respectively. From this we can
conclude two things: first of all, we observe a very pronounced mean wealth gap between East
and West Germany. In 2002 an average West German citizens had almost 51,000 e more at her
disposal than a comparable East German. Put diﬀerently, an average household member in the
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East owned only about 42 % of the net asset position of an average person in the West. Second of
all, we see that the relative mean wealth positions do not change much over the years. As can be
seen in Table 3, the average wealth gap widens slightly to about 53,000 e in 2012. For the median
wealth level we find a similar pattern: with about 12,000 e in 2002, the median wealth in East
Germany is much lower compared to West Germany where it stands at 38,885 e. East Germans
exhibit almost 27,000 e less net worth than westerners, which puts their relative wealth levels
at only 31 % of the western levels. Until 2012, the median net worth increased in both regions to
13,645 e and 39,390 e, respectively, while the median wealth gap decreases to roughly 26,000 e.
These findings apply more or less to the distribution as a whole. If we examine the distribution
of net wealth along diﬀerent quantiles, we find that eastern households hold less wealth at almost
any point of the distribution and that this wealth gap remains relatively constant over time. Due
to this distributional stability we will again focus on 2012 if not otherwise indicated. Up till the
25 % quantile one does not observe any noteworthy wealth gap, since household members in this
vicinity own similarly low levels of wealth - in fact many own no wealth at all. Above this point,
we see a rapidly increasing wealth gap. While western citizens at the 30 % quantile dispose of
almost 4,000 e more than their eastern compatriots, this number rises quickly to around 42,000
e at the 60 % quantile and to more than 116,000 e at the 90% quantile. The ratio of eastern
to western wealth also increases along the distribution - from 35 % at the 30 % quantile to 48
% at the 90 % quantile.
Another way to illustrate the wealth disparities between the two regions is to consider the
disproportional low share of total wealth of eastern Germans. While eastern household constitute
21 % of the sample population, they only account for about 10 % of the overall net wealth in
the sample. One can again contrast this with net income where the share of East Germans is 19
% and thus much closer to what one would expect under parity. The substantial diﬀerence in
wealth is also evident when looking at the percentage of household members holding negative
or zero net wealth. For West Germany about one in five (19.20 %) individuals hold non-positive
levels of net worth while the corresponding number for the East is closer to one in four (23.99
%).
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We find, similarly to Hauser (2010), that the distribution of wealth is more unequal in the
East than in the West while the opposite is true for the distribution of income. However, the
magnitude of this diﬀerence is generally not very large. As noted by Grabka and Westermeier
(2014), the general inequality does not change much over time. The mostly larger quantile ratios
for East Germany indicate that rich citizens in the East tend to accumulate higher multiples
of wealth compared to their less fortunate fellow easterners than is the case in West Germany.
For instance, the mean-to-median ratio is about 2.4 for West Germany but 3 for East Germany.
This suggests a longer right tail for the East. Moreover, the Gini coeﬃcient for East Germany
is about 73 % while it is closer to 70.5 % for the West.
Insert Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 4 about here.
The diﬀerences in the distributions of wealth between East and West can also be seen visually.
Figure 1 shows the histogram for East and West Germany, separately for each sample year. It
is obvious that the distribution for East Germany exhibits higher densities at lower levels of net
wealth. Especially the peak at zero net wealth is much more pronounced compared to West
Germany. Starting from a value of about 50,000 e, the density for West Germany overtakes
the eastern distribution. There is not much apparent diﬀerences between the distributions in
the diﬀerent years. The comparison via adaptive kernel density estimates in Figure 2 gives a
very similar picture in this regard. Looking at the empirical CDFs in Figure 3, one can see
the wealth gap opens after the 20 % quantile. Before that point, the two curves are largely
indistinguishable due to the high number of household members with zero wealth in both parts
of the country. It is also easy to see, that the gap increases at each quantile. Figure 4 illustrates
this point again by plotting the inverse empirical cumulative density functions (also known as
”parade of the dwarfs”).
3.2 Composition of Net Wealth
Besides looking at the distribution of per capita net wealth itself, it is also insightful to assert
how total net wealth is made up. As already mentioned, the GSOEP questionnaire asks for
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information on six kinds of assets as well as three diﬀerent types of debt. Table 5 entails
information on mean participation rates for these wealth components separately for each region
and year. From this we can see, for instance, that around one in two West Germans owns
owner-occupied real estate and about one in four westerners holds mortgages associated with
such housing wealth. The majority of people in both regions owns some kind of financial assets
or insurance and pension wealth while only very few people hold business wealth.
With the purpose of the decomposition analysis in mind, it seems worthwhile to assert
the diﬀerences in participation rates for these diﬀerent wealth components across the country.
Looking at Table 6, it is striking that the by far largest gap in ownership rates between the
two regions is found for owner-occupied housing. In 2012, West Germans had a 12.5 percentage
points higher probability to own a self-occupied real estate object than their eastern compatriots.
Ownership of almost all other wealth components is also more common in West Germany as is
evident from the positive gap in participation rates. The diﬀerences in participation rates are,
however, usually not as pronounced as is the case for owner-occupied housing. Non-mortgage
private debt constitutes a general exception in this regard. In 2012 East Germans were actually
almost 5 % more likely to hold this type of debt compared to westerners.
Insert Table 5, Table 6, Table 7 and Table 8 about here.
Another way to look at this issue is to consider the amount of money that accrues to each
of the wealth components. Yet, as we have seen in Table 5, most wealth components are not
widely owned in the population. Therefore, even the median value is zero for most assets and
all debt types. Consequently, we only consider mean asset and debt levels in the following.
For this purpose, Table 7 and Table 8 portray the mean values and the mean diﬀerences for
each sub-category, respectively. It is evident that the mean amount for any category, except
for non-mortgage debt, is higher in West Germany. This diﬀerence is especially pronounced for
home equity which is responsible for large parts of the average gap in net wealth. Out of the
mean wealth gap of roughly 53,000 e in 2012, about 53 % (or 28,000 e) are associated with
diﬀerences in net owner-occupied housing wealth. This is not entirely surprising as home equity
constitutes the main asset in the portfolio of the average German. Around 53 % of the net worth
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of the average investor in both regions is tied to home equity. Still, these findings emphasize the
importance of real estate in the portfolio of the average investor and suggest that diﬀerences in
real estate investments might help to explain large parts of the wealth gap.
3.3 Summary Statistics for Wealth Determinants
In the last section, we have established that a substantial wealth gap between the inhabitants of
the former GDR and the western federal states remains even almost 25 years since reunification
and shows little sign of diminishing. The main objective of this paper is to decompose this
observed wealth gap into a part that can be attributed to observable diﬀerences in potential
wealth determinants and an unexplained part that is associated with unobservable factors. These
unobserved factors could, for instance, be omitted variables or institutional diﬀerences due to
the diﬀerent political systems before reunification. For this subsequent decomposition analysis
it is paramount to first examine summary statistics of potential explanatory variables of wealth
in our sample. We focus on variables that are likely to play an important role for the wealth
formation of individuals. With regard to the explanatory power for the observed wealth gap, it
is most interesting to assess how much the distributions of these potential wealth determinants
diﬀer between East and West Germany. We group the most promising variables into four
main categories: permanent net income, variables associated with the average labor market
situation of household members, the average education level within a household as well as socio-
demographic and family background variables. Table 9 presents descriptions of the variables
that we include in each of these categories. It is well known that income is among the most
important determinants of wealth as a high discretionary income enables one to save and invest
in diﬀerent assets. According to the permanent income hypothesis, long-term income is more
important in this regard than transitory income. To proxy for permanent income, we take the
average over per capita net monthly income over the past five years. We include the average
lifetime experience for full-time, part-time and unemployment in the model in order to account
for the labor market experience of household members. Furthermore, we control for the share
of members of a household that hold very prestigious jobs, are self-employed or retired. To
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assess the average education level in a household, we include the share of household members
who are highly educated (i.e. college graduates) or have some kind of vocational education (i.e.
skilled workers or master craftsmen). Important socio-demographic variables in this context are
the average age within a household, the share of male, married and foreign household members
as well as persons with chronic health problems. For instance, younger household members
are expected to possess smaller fortunes as they had only little time to accumulate wealth.
Moreover, we control for the household size and the number of kids up to the age of 16 in the
household as the need to finance children or other family members restricts the opportunity to
accumulate assets. The social background of a person is likely to have a substantial eﬀect on her
financial situation, either indirectly via values learned or directly through financial contribution
by close relatives. We include the share of individuals in the household with college educated
parents to account for these eﬀects. On the other hand we add dummy variables that indicate
if any household member ever received any type of bequest and whether this inheritance was
substantial.
Insert Table 9, Table 10, Table 11 and Table 12 about here.
Table 10 illustrates summary statistics for these variables for Germany as a whole pooled over
all years and is included primarily for completeness as we are chiefly interested in diﬀerences
between East and West Germany. For this reason, Table 11 features the mean levels of the
explanatory factors for each region and year separately. Finally, the average diﬀerences in the
wealth determinants between West and East Germany for each year are given in Table 12. We
will again focus on the year 2012 since the regional diﬀerences remain steady over time as is
evident from Table 12. From the tables we can see that a conspicuous diﬀerence exists for
permanent income between the two regions. On average West Germans dispose of 1,375 e net
monthly income while the equivalent figure for East Germans is only 1,153 e. This results in an
extra 225 e that the average West German has at her disposal. This substantial income gap is
likely associated with the observed wealth gap, especially if we keep in mind that such income
diﬀerentials have persisted ever since the reunification. Looking at labor market experience, we
find that an average household member in both regions spends by far the longest time of her
16
career in full-time employment. Furthermore, East Germans have three and a half years more
full-time experience on average - probably due to the higher labor market participation rate of
women in the GDR. At the same time the average duration spent in unemployment is double
as high as for western household members. While East Germans are unemployed for about 22
month on average, the average West German spends only 10 month in unemployment. This is
likely to have a negative eﬀect on the relative financial situation of East Germans since one can
hardly build up assets during periods of unemployment and maybe even has to deplete one’s
savings. We also see that East Germans are slightly better educated - probably due to deliberate
political measures during the GDR intended to increase the college attendance of working class
citizens. With regard to the social demographic characteristics the most striking diﬀerence is
the share of foreign household members. While the share of eastern household members with
a non-German citizenship is only 1 %, the respective figure for the West is 11 %. Given that
individuals with migrant background tend to hold lower levels of wealth compared to natives,
this is bound to have an eﬀect on the distribution across the country. What is more, members of
East German households are slightly older and less numerous. Referring to socio-demographic
background, we find that households in East Germany are more likely to feature members whose
parents are college educated. This can probably be attributed to the same reasons as for the
case of the education level of the household members themselves. On the other hand, western
households are likelier to exhibit members that have received an inheritance. They are even
twice as likely to have received a substantial inheritance (10 % vs. 5 %) which should make
them more prosperous. Overall about one in four households in Germany received some form of
inheritance or gift.
4 Decomposition Analysis
The goal of decomposition analyses is to segment diﬀerences in distributional statistics for some
variables between time-periods or sub-populations. It allows one to quantify the contribution of
observable factors to the distributional diﬀerences between the groups under consideration for the
variable of interest. In the following, we draw heavily from Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo (2011),
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who provide an excellent overview of decomposition methods in econometrics. The starting
point of any decomposition analysis is the observed diﬀerence for a given distributional statistic
between the sub-populations of interest. We denote this overall gap as ∆νo , where ν denotes
the distributional statistic of choice. Due to its predominant role in econometric analyses, the
statistic under consideration will often be the sample mean. In the context of this paper we are
interested, among others, in the average wealth gap between East and West Germany.
The so-called aggregate decomposition is aimed at partitioning the overall diﬀerence into an
”explained” and an ”unexplained” part. The ”explained” part is also called composition eﬀect
and denoted as ∆νx. It represents the part of the overall gap that is associated with diﬀerences
in the observable characteristics x. The ”unexplained” part will be referred to as the wealth
structure eﬀect in the context of this paper and is labeled ∆νw. It captures the contribution of
all unobserved characteristics as well as diﬀerences in the conditional expected wealth function,
i.e. how individuals in the two regions transfer the observed characteristics, such as income, into






It is insightful in itself to assess how much of the overall gap is associated with diﬀerences in
the covariates as well as how much that share changes along the distribution. Yet, one is usually
also interested in isolating the contribution of certain parts of the vector of wealth determinants.
Regarding the application to the wealth gap it might, for instance, be interesting to know how
much variations in permanent income help to explain disparities in per capita net wealth. This
approach is known as detailed decomposition and usually requires stronger assumptions than
the aggregate decomposition. It is important to note that the resulting eﬀects should not be
interpreted in a causal sense. Rather, they are of a descriptive nature and meant to give an
understanding of the magnitude of the contribution of observable characteristics towards the
observed diﬀerence in the variable of interest. Moreover, they are general equilibrium eﬀects as
they do not take into account the potential behavioral changes associated with them (see Biewen
2014).
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When it comes to implementing the decomposition analysis, several methods exist, each
which its own advantages and limitations. The most popular decomposition method is the
Oaxaca-Blinder composition (see Fortin et al. 2011). It owes its popularity to its ease of imple-
mentation via OLS and the fact that it naturally allows for detailed composition. However, this
method assumes a linear relationship between the variable of interest and the explanatory fac-
tors and only allows for the decomposition of mean diﬀerentials. This restriction is problematic
when it comes to analyzing wealth distributions. As mentioned before, wealth distributions are
generally very spread-out and right-skewed. Thus, the mean of the distribution is usually much
higher than the median and not necessarily informative regarding the wealth of a typical person
or household. More generally, one should try to get a more complete picture of the wealth gap,
for instance by studying the diﬀerence at diﬀerent quantiles of the distribution. Moreover, one
is often interested in other characteristics of the wealth distribution apart from its level. For
example, large fractions of the population exhibit non-positive net wealth. It is of interest to also
examine the diﬀerence in this fraction between the groups under consideration. In addition, one
is often interested in inequality-measures such as the Gini coeﬃcient or the inter-quartile range.
Thus, a technique that allows to decompose diﬀerent summary measures of the distribution is
favorable in this context.
A method making it possible to decompose disparities along the entire distribution with
little assumptions was introduced by DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996). They propose a
reweighting approach, similar to propensity score matching, where one aligns the distribution of
the covariates between the two populations in order to identify the composition eﬀect and the
unexplained proportion. They first applied this method to analyze changes in the distribution of
wages in the USA from 1973 to 1992. Due to its flexibility, the reweighting approach (henceforth
DFL method) has become widely-used ever since (see Fortin et al. 2011). Usually, the DFL
method is combined with adaptive kernel density estimation where one uses the reweighting
factors during the smoothing procedure. The main advantages of this practice is that one
can easily visualize the distributional diﬀerences and that it leads to variance-reduction of the
estimators. However, Biewen (2001) stresses that the correct application of this smoothing
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method is quite challenging. He continues by pointing out that one is often mainly interested
in assessing the eﬀect on certain summary measures of the distribution such as quantiles or
inequality indices which are easily obtained from the unsmoothed distribution itself. Thus,
smoothing is not necessary unless one is interested in the graphical display of the diﬀerences. As
both Bover (2010) and Cowell, Karagiannaki and McKnight (2013) note, there is yet another
important obstacle to the application of smoothing methods in the context of analyses of wealth
distributions. As mentioned before, it is an empirical fact that most distributions exhibit a
marked spike at zero net wealth. Bover (2010) emphasizes that the sensitivity of smoothing
methods is exacerbated by the presence of such spikes. For this reason we will follow the same
approach and focus on cumulative distribution functions (CDF). This makes it unnecessary to
apply smoothing techniques as in the case of densities.
The main disadvantage of the DFL method, however, is that it cannot readily be applied to
detailed decompositions. Generally one can only assess the contribution of dummy variables on
the composition eﬀect (see Fortin et al. 2011). Yet, Cobb-Clark and Hildebrand (2006) show
how one can extend the original reweighting approach in a straight forward fashion in order to
diﬀerentiate ∆νx by groups of covariates. Still, one is constrained in the number of segments
in which the composition eﬀect can be partitioned. Therefore, one usually confines oneself to
certain groups of covariates such as socio-demographic variables or labor market indicators (see
Cobb-Clark and Hildebrand 2006, Bauer et al. 2011, Sierminska et al. 2010). Moreover, these
detailed eﬀects exhibit sequential ordering. Thus, a Shapley decomposition approach, where one
averages over all possible sequences, has to be employed.12
We follow the course of action of the aforementioned papers and restrict ourselves to reweight-
ing the majority group (in our case individuals situated in West Germany) with the character-
istics of the comparison group (household members in East Germany). This is necessary due to
compressed value ranges of certain variables in the East which would otherwise require extrap-
olation of values and potentially lead to extreme reweighting factors for certain observations.
Hence, one only uses those sequences in which the main group is reweighted and averages over
12See Shorrocks (2013).
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all the resulting sequences. In the following, we describe this decomposition method in more
detail.
4.1 Aggregate Decompositon
We start out by explaining the mechanics of the aggregate decomposition via reweighting. In
order to decompose the wealth distribution between East and West Germany, one has to control
for observable factors that might help to explain the wealth diﬀerentials between the two re-
gions. Therefore, we are mainly interested in the conditional distribution of wealth given these
factors. Remembering that the unconditional distribution can be written as the integral over
the conditional distributions weighted by the density of the conditioning factors, we can write
the unconditional distribution for the average wealth of individuals in West Germany as:
F11 = F (w|W = 1) =
∫
x
F (w|x,W = 1) · dF (x|W = 1) (2)
Here, wealth is denoted by a lower case w while the indicator for residency in West Germany is
given by a capitalW . Individuals living in West Germany are indicated by 1 while those situated
in East Germany are labeled by 0. F (w|x,W = 1) is the conditional expected wealth function
for individuals belonging to West German households while dF (x|W = 1) is the distribution of
the wealth determinants in the same region. Consequentially, F11 denotes the distribution of
wealth that prevails if both the wealth function and the distribution of observable factors are as
in West Germany.13 In the same fashion, the observed distribution for East German household
members can be written as:
F00 = F (w|W = 0) =
∫
x
F (w|x,W = 0) · dF (x|W = 0) (3)
Now one can easily compute the overall diﬀerence in wealth between the two regions for a
specific summary measure ν by taking the diﬀerence between the corresponding statistics for
the two observed distributions: ∆νo = ν(F11)− ν(F00). To decompose this diﬀerence, one needs
13Here, we make use of the following equality for the distribution of the covariates:
dF (x|W = 1) = f(x|W = 1)dx.
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to estimate a corresponding counterfactual distribution first. The counterfactual distribution of
wealth for West Germany is the distribution one would obtain if the conditional wealth function
remained as in the West whereas the distribution of observable characteristics was as in the




F (w|x,W = 1) · dF (x|W = 0) (4)
It is not immediately obvious how one can compute such a counterfactual distribution. Di-
Nardo et al. (1996) argue that a straight forward way to obtain the counterfactual distribution is
to reweight the distribution of covariates in the majority group in such a way that it matches the
corresponding distribution found in the comparison population. This can be seen by rewriting





dF (x|W = 0)
dF (x|W = 1)
]
· F (w|x,W = 1) · dF (x|W = 1) (5)
We see immediately that this expression is just the observed distribution for the West mul-
tiplied by the factor dF (x|W = 0)/dF (x|W = 1). This term is called the reweighting factor and
will be denoted henceforth by Ψ(x). It ensures that the distribution of x is the same in both




Ψ(x) · F (w|x,W = 1) · dF (x|W = 1) (6)
The main question is how to estimate the reweighting factor, which is the ratio of two
multivariate density functions. DiNardo et al. (1996) show that the reweighting factor can be
written in terms of ratios of probabilities via Bayes’ theorem:
Ψ(x) =
dF (x|W = 0)
dF (x|W = 1)
=
P (x|W = 0)
P (x|W = 1)
=
P (W = 1|x)
P (W = 0|x)
·
P (W = 0)
P (W = 1)
(7)
In our case, P (W = 1|x) is the probability of living in West Germany conditional on the
wealth determinants in x. P (W = 0|x) gives the same measure for East Germany while P (W =
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0) and P (W = 1) represent the unconditional probabilities of living in East or West Germany,
respectively. The probabilities needed for the reweighting factor can be readily estimated from a
given sample. For instance, P̂ (W = 0) and P̂ (W = 1) are just the observed fraction of individuals
living East and West Germany in our sample. In order to estimate the conditional probabilities,
one can do so either non-parametrically or by imposing more structure on the relationship -
usually via a probit or logit model. The non-parametric approach oﬀers the advantage that
the relationship between factors can be modeled with a maximum of flexibility. This point is
stressed by Barsky, Bound, Charles and Lupton (2002) who use such a reweighting scheme to
decompose the wealth gap between black and white households in the United States with respect
to household income. They argue that such flexibility is especially crucial in their case due to
the unknown relationship between household wealth and income. This relation is likely highly
non-linear and thus hard to parametrize. However, any non-parametric method suﬀers from the
well-known curse of dimensionality, i.e. the inability to model the influence of several covariates
in such a context. For this very reason, Barsky et al. (2002) do not control for other relevant
variables besides household income. This is a major limitation of the non-parametric approach.
Therefore, most studies using reweighting decomposition employ parametric specifications (see
Fortin et al. 2011). In this paper, we use logit models to estimate the conditional regional
probabilities. Thus, the estimator for the reweighting factor is written as:
Ψ̂x =
P̂ (W = 1|x)
P̂ (W = 0|x)
·
P̂ (W = 0)
P̂ (W = 1)
(8)
With this estimator, we can compute the counterfactual wealth distribution for western
individuals if these had the same distribution of characteristics as their eastern compatriots,
F10. Now, we can finally put all these concepts together to illustrate the implementation of the
decomposition method in Equation 1. We write the decomposed wealth gap between West and
East Germany for a distributional statistic ν as:
ν(F11)− ν(F00)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆νo
= ν(F11)− ν(F10)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆νx




Here ν(F11) − ν(F10) represents the composition eﬀect because only the distribution of the
x vector is changed while the conditional wealth functions are the same. ν(F01) − ν(F00), on
the other hand, is the wealth structure eﬀect since the distributions of wealth determinants are
identical but the conditional wealth functions diﬀer from each other. In this fashion, we can
assess how much of the observed gap along the wealth distribution can be attributed to the
combined influence of observable factors.
4.2 Detailed Decompositon
As previously mentioned, we are often not interested in the composition eﬀect ∆νx alone but
also in the contribution of specific elements of x to the diﬀerences in relative wealth positions.
In the context of this paper it is reasonable to follow the approach by previous papers on this
topic14 and split the vector of covariates into four sub-vectors: permanent income (y), variables
associated with the average labor market situation of a household (l), the average education
level within a household (e) and a vector of socio-demographic background variables (d). All
these factors play an important role in the formation of wealth. Our aim is to attribute parts of








d. As for the aggregate
decomposition, we start out by writing the observed wealth distribution in West Germany in










F (w|y, l, e, d,W = 1) · dF (y|l, e, d,W = 1)
· dF (l|e, d,W = 1) · dF (e|d,W = 1) · dF (d|W = 1) (10)
Here, the conditional wealth distribution for West Germany, F (w|y, l, d,W = 1), is identical
to F (w|x,W = 1) in Equation 2 for the aggregate case as x = {y, l, e, d}. However, unlike before
this conditional wealth function is not only weighted by the joint distribution of all covariates in
the West, dF (x|W = 1). Instead, we have a density for each subset of variables. These weight-
14See Cobb-Clark and Hildebrand (2006), Sierminska et al. (2010) and Bauer et al. (2011).
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ing factors are ordered in a sequence that is economically plausible. For instance, ones income
depends on ones labor market experience, education and general socio-demographic background.
Therefore, we consider the distribution of the particular subset conditional on the underlying
covariates. In this case dF (y|l, e, d,W = 1) is the conditional income function for western house-
hold members given their labor market situation, educational attainment and social background.










F (w|y, l, e, d,W = 0) · dF (y|l, e, d,W = 0)
· dF (l|e, d,W = 0) · dF (e|d,W = 0) · dF (d|W = 0) (11)
Because we have split the vector of covariates into several subgroups of covariates, we can the-
oretically compute counterfactual distributions with respect to any single one of these subgroups
as well as any combination of these components. Consider, for instance, the counterfactual dis-
tribution of per capita net wealth of West Germans that would occur if everything was as in
West Germany but the distribution of permanent income, conditional on the other covariates,










F (w|y, l, e, d,W = 1) · dF (y|l, e, d,W = 0)
· dF (l|e, d,W = 1) · dF (e|d,W = 1) · dF (d|W = 1) (12)
As for the aggregate case, we can approach this problem by reweighting the observed distri-












dF (y|l, e, d,W = 0)
dF (y|l, e, d,W = 1)
]
· F (w|y, l, e, d,W = 1) · dF (y|l, e, d,W = 1)
· dF (l|e, d,W = 1) · dF (e|d,W = 1) · dF (d|W = 1) (13)
When we rewrite this factor via Bayes’ law we can see that it is very similar to the aggregate
reweighting factor in Equation 8. However, instead of a ratio of unconditional probabilites as in
the aggregate case, the second part of the factor is ratio of conditional probabilities here. In the
first ratio we condition on all covariates, including permanent income. For the second ratio we
do not condition on income. In this manner one isolates the relationship between income and
region of residence. We denote this reweighting factors as Ψ(y|l, e, d) to write the counterfactual
distribution more compactly.
Ψ(y|l, e, d) =
dF (y|l, e, d,W = 0)
dF (y|l, e, d,W = 1)
=
P (W = 1|y, l, e, d)
P (W = 0|y, l, e, d)
·
P (W = 0|l, e, d)











Ψ(y|l, e, d) · F (w|y, l, e, d,W = 1) · dF (y|l, e, d,W = 1)
· dF (l|e, d,W = 1) · dF (e|d,W = 1) · dF (d|W = 1) (15)
Similarly, we obtain the counterfactual distribution F11011, which results from setting the
western labor market history to its eastern equivalent, by employing the reweighting factor
Ψ(l|e, d) = P (W=1|l,e,d)
P (W=0|l,e,d) ·
P (W=0|e,d)
P (W=1|e,d) . On the other hand, if one only changes the vector of socio-
demographic background to obtain the counterfactual distribution F11110, the reweighting factor
Ψ(d) = P (W=1|d)
P (W=0|d) ·
P (W=0)
P (W=1) is needed. In such a way, any kind of counterfactual distribution can
be calculated. For instance, in order to assess the impact of simultaneously changing y, e and
d while holding l fixed, i.e. F10100, we nee to compute Ψ(y|l, e, d) ·Ψ(e|d) ·Ψ(d). To obtain the
decomposition eﬀects, we have to subtract distributional statistics from each other which stem
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from distributions that diﬀer in one factor only. There are several possibilities how this can be
accomplished. One possible decomposition sequence is the following:
ν(F11111)− ν(F00000)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆νo
= ν(F11111)− ν(F10111)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆νy
+ ν(F10111)− ν(F10011)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆νl
+ ν(F10011)− ν(F10001)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆νe
+ ν(F10001)− ν(F10000)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆νd
+ ν(F10000)− ν(F00000)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆νw
(16)
For example, ν(F11111)−ν(F10111) gives us the eﬀect of changing permanent income because
the two distributions involved diﬀer only in this respect. Actually, there are n! diﬀerent se-
quences, in which such a decomposition can be computed, where n is the number of subsets in
x plus one. In this case there are 5! = 120 diﬀerent sequences to decompose the wealth gap.
However, only 24 of these possible sequences depend entirely on the conditional wealth function
in West Germany (i.e. involve counterfactual distributions of the form F1xxxx). One can show




w are the same for each of these 24 decompositions, in the spirit of the






d) can be diﬀerent
for each decomposition. The reason for this is that the counterfactual distributions depend on
which factor is changed first. For this reason this approach is called sequential decomposition as
it depends on the sequence of changes. Thus, one reports the eﬀect for each subset averaged over
all possible decomposition sequences. This is known as Shapley decomposition as introduced by
Shorrocks (2013).
5 Empirical Results
In the following we present the results of the decomposition analyses. We focus again on the latest
year available, 2012, since the results for the other two sample years are qualitatively similar.
The corresponding tables can be found in the appendix. When reporting the decomposition
results, we will omit the ν subscript at this point for the sake of clarity.
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5.1 Results of Aggregate Decomposition
We start by looking at the aggregate decomposition and concentrate on the overall explanatory
power of our wealth determinants, i.e. how much of the observed gap can be attributed to
observable diﬀerences in the characteristics of eastern and western citizens. Firstly, Table 13
presents summary statistics for per capita net wealth in East and West Germany as already
reported in Table 2 of Section 3.1. Secondly, it shows the counterfactual distribution, i.e. the
distribution of wealth in West Germany that would arise if western citizens had the same dis-
tribution of the observable characteristics that prevails in the East. The CDF’s for these three
distributions are depicted in Figure 5. Moreover, Table 13 displays the already familiar observed
wealth gap (∆o) together with the part of the gap that is associated with the covariates (∆x)
as well as the part that cannot be explained by these factors (∆w). In addition to these figures
we report bootstrap standard errors to assess whether the estimates are statistically significant.
Table 14 displays the overall gap, the composition eﬀect and the wealth structure eﬀect for
selected summary measures only along with the relative share of the overall gap corresponding
to each component.
Insert Table 13 and Table 14 about here.
The first interesting information in these tables is the counterfactual distribution of net
wealth. We can see, for instance, that the average West German has total net assets of about
94,000 e. If we reweight the characteristics of the population in the West to match those in the
East, we find that an average person would then hold only around 73,500 e. Thus, the more
unfavorable composition of the covariates in East Germany is associated with a reduction of the
average net wealth by about 20,500 e. Yet, the counterfactual mean wealth is still much closer
to the original figure of the West than to that of the East, which is only about 41,000 e. As a
rule of thumb, the closer the reweighted distribution for the West is to the distribution in the
East, the larger the part of the gap that is associated with the covariates. Looking at Figure 5,
we can see how the relative position of the counterfactual distribution changes along the levels
of net wealth. As we have seen in Section 3.1, there is little diﬀerence between the distributions
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for East and West Germany up to the lower quartile due to the high numbers of individuals
with no net worth. Above this point one can observe that at first the CDF of the counterfactual
distribution is very close to that for the eastern population. As one moves up in the distribution,
however, the counterfactual CDF moves closer and closer to the western CDF. This indicates
that the potential wealth determinants help to explain a good amount of the observed wealth
diﬀerences in the lower part of the distribution but have little explanatory power in the upper
part. This is quite reasonable as large fortunes can come about in many ways. Thus, they are
not easily reduced to a small number of underlying factors.
By looking at the decomposition results, one can more easily quantify the contribution of the
covariates to the wealth gap along the distribution. For instance, we quickly note that out of the
nearly 53,000 e mean wealth gap, around 20,500 e are associated with the composition eﬀect
while about 32,500 e are due to the wealth structure eﬀect. Thus, the wealth determinants are
corresponding to only 38.74 % of the mean wealth gap. Due to the lack of substantive wealth
diﬀerences below the 25 % quantile, only relatively small values exist for ∆x and ∆w over this
range. In addition, the bootstrap standard errors are quite large in this area so that the eﬀects are
not significant at the 5 % level. Starting from the lower quartile we observe a positive wealth
gap which is widening substantially with increasing levels of net wealth. Between the lower
quartile and the median the composition eﬀect is as large as or even larger than the observed
wealth gap itself. The wealth structure eﬀect in this region is therefore negative. However, ∆w is
usually not statistically significant in this vicinity. As a result, one cannot say whether the share
accounted for by ∆x is actually larger than 100 %. As one moves further up the distribution, it
becomes evident that the observable factors contribute less and less to the overall gap. While
the variables in the x vector are associated with 78.29 % of the median wealth gap (about 20,000
e out of roughly 25,750 e), this proportion declines quickly and constitutes only about 34 %
of the gap at the upper quartile (around 22,700 e of 66,600 e). The share associated with the
composition eﬀect stabilizes after the 75 % quantile at about one third of the overall gap. For
instance, at the 90 % quantile about 33,700 e, or 29 % of an overall gap of 116,300 e, are due to
∆x. For the distributional measures, such as the Gini coeﬃcient or the ratio of 90 % quantile to
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median, we find very large relative composition eﬀects. In fact, the contribution of the covariates
is much higher than the gap actually observed. For instance, the relative contribution of the
wealth determinants to the diﬀerence between the Gini coeﬃcient in the two regions is 215.80
%. Thus, the composition eﬀect is more than twice as high as the observed gap. The results
also suggest that the share of individuals with no positive net worth would be even higher in the
counterfactual distribution than in the East - more than 26 % compared to the actual share of
about 19 % in the West and roughly 24 % in the East. Decomposing such small diﬀerences is,
however, usually quite diﬃcult. This could also mean that the higher observed inequality in the
East could actually be much worse if people had not accommodated themselves to the prevalent
conditions.
5.2 Results of Detailed Decomposition
To assess in more detail how these figures come about, we examine the results for the detailed
decomposition in Table 15 and Table 16. As before, we concentrate mainly on Table 16 where
the share of the overall gap is given for selected summary measures. What is striking in this
regard is that for all wealth levels the contribution of educational attainment (∆e) as well as
socio-demographic background (∆d) on the observed gap are consistently negative. This means
by assigning the prevailing distribution of these variables in the East to the western population,
one would actually increase the wealth gap. The share of the overall gap due to diﬀerences in
socio-demographic background is mostly in the range of minus 5 % and minus 10 %. For the
lower half of the distribution, however, this eﬀect is not statistically significant. The absolute
magnitude of the eﬀect of education diﬀerences is much larger in the lower half of the distribution
and it is nearly always statistically significant. Yet, this eﬀect quickly decreases in size so that
its relative share in the upper part of the distribution is usually smaller than that of ∆d. The
combined contribution of these two categories varies somewhere between about minus 25 % at
the lower quartile and minus 11 % at the upper quartile. Together they are associated with
about minus 7,200 e of the mean wealth gap, which is equivalent to a share of approximately
minus 13.5 %.
30
Even though one cannot assess the contribution of individual variables in this framework,
some potential reasons for these findings come to mind. First of all, as we have seen in Section 3.3,
the education level of household members in the East as well as that of their parents are on
average higher than for those in the West. Higher educational attainment is usually associated
with higher levels of wealth.15 Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that if one applied the
East German distribution of these variables to West Germany, it would result in higher levels
of net worth. A similar argument can be brought forth for the share of foreign nationals. Bauer
et al. (2011) note that native Germans exhibit much higher levels of wealth compared to those
inhabitants with a foreign nationality. West Germany has an 11 times higher share of non-
German nationals than the eastern federal states. Attributing this lower eastern figure to West
Germany should therefore lead to higher wealth levels in the counterfactual distribution. Such
relationships might explain these negative decomposition results.
Insert Table 15 and Table 16 about here.
The eﬀects of income diﬀerentials (∆y) and diﬀerent labor market outcomes (∆l), in contrast,
are positive, usually quite substantial in magnitude and highly statistical significant. Unsurpris-
ingly, given the negative eﬀects of ∆e and ∆d, their combined contribution is even higher than
the total composition eﬀect. Looking at the mean wealth gap, we find that in fact more than
half of the observed gap is due to the combined eﬀect of income diﬀerentials and labor market
diﬀerences. Roughly 16,700 e of the diﬀerence can be traced back to higher incomes in the West.
This is equivalent to 31.59 % of the overall gap or rather 81.54 % of the composition eﬀect. With
about 11,000 e the contribution of the diﬀerences in labor market histories is somewhat smaller
but still presents 20.70 % of ∆o and 53.44 % of ∆x. The two eﬀects are usually of the same size
although the income eﬀect is larger for high levels of wealth. The combined share of the two
categories declines along the distribution and ranges from 138 % at the lower quartile to about
45 % at the 90 % quantile. It is harder to make definitive statements for the distributional
measures due to the extreme nature of the eﬀects involved. As for the quantiles, ∆y and ∆l are
by far the most important contributing factors in this context. These two eﬀects are roughly
15See Sierminska et al. (2010).
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comparable in size and each as large as the overall wealth gap itself. The magnitudes of ∆e and
∆d, on the other hand, are again rather small. All this indicates that the explanatory power of
certain parts of the wealth determinants is actually higher than the aggregated figures suggest.
The fact that the direction of the individual contributions go into diﬀerent directions is lost
when one looks at the aggregated eﬀects only.
5.3 The Role of Home-Equity
As we have seen in Table 7, owner-occupied real estate constitutes the main asset in the portfolio
of the average German. Having said that, a study by the ECB’s Eurosystem Household Finance
and Consumption Network (HFCS 2013) finds that Germany and Austria are the countries in
the euro zone with the lowest share of home-owners. The study further suggests that this low
propensity to hold self-utilized real estate is related to the relative low levels of median net
wealth in these two countries as well as their relative high levels of wealth inequality. This holds
true in particular in comparison to countries like Spain. From Section 3.2 we know that the
chief diﬀerence in the investment behavior of East and West Germans lies in their propensity to
own a home, which is 12.50 percentage points lower in the East. Thus, it is reasonable to assess
whether such a relationship between diﬀerences in home-ownership rates and wealth levels can
also be found within Germany.
To evaluate the potential eﬀect of diﬀerentials in the propensity for home-ownership, we
include a housing dummy in the decomposition analysis in addition to the usual wealth de-
terminants. More specifically, we model the decision to own a home as being conditional on
ones permanent income, labor market history, education and socio-demographic background.
Although this approach makes intuitive sense, it is problematic to use home-ownership in such
a way as it is itself a part of net wealth. Nevertheless, we still proceed in this fashion as we
primarily seek to explore this relationship in a descriptive manner.
Insert Table 17 and Table 18 about here.
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Table 17 reports the results for this extension of the original analysis.16 We find that the
housing eﬀect (∆h) is positive but its magnitude is usually much lower than that of permanent
income (∆y) and labor market situation (∆l). Including home-ownership increases the compo-
sition eﬀect at the mean by about 10 percentage points. This is equivalent to a third (half) of
the size of the eﬀect of permanent income (labor market status). At the median the housing
dummy increases the explanatory power of ∆x by about 23 percentage points. This is, however,
still only slightly more than half the magnitude of the other two eﬀects. For the measures of
inequality and the share of individuals with no positive net worth the pattern is similar: the
direction of the eﬀect is the same as for ∆y and ∆l but considerably smaller in size.
Another way to look at this issue is to decompose the participation rates and wealth levels
for home equity directly. In this fashion we can estimate how much of the mean diﬀerence in
owner-occupied housing is corresponding to diﬀerences in the distribution of covariates. The
resulting eﬀects are given in Table 18. We consider the participation rates for home equity as
well as mortgages associated with such real estate. In addition, we look into the mean gross and
net wealth levels invested in owner-occupied housing along with the gross value of home loans.
Finally, net housing wealth for self-utilized property is scrutinized. What is most notable in
Table 18, is the discrepancy between the results for the mean wealth levels and the participation
rates. The decomposition eﬀects for both gross and net home equity are quite similar to those
for net wealth as a whole. In either case the relative share of the composition eﬀect is of the same
order of magnitude as for total net wealth (40.00 % and 33.13 %, respectively). Furthermore, we
also see relative large positive eﬀects for income and labor market situation while the contribu-
tions of education level and social background are negative and much smaller in magnitude. The
gap in participation rates for home equity and corresponding home loans, on the other hand,
are much better explained by the diﬀerentials in observable characteristics. For instance, nearly
11 percentage points, out of the 12.48 percentage point gap in the participation rates for home
ownership, can be attributed to diﬀerences in the covariates. This disparity between the relative
magnitudes of the composition eﬀect for the participation rates and the actual mean property
16For reasons of clarity we subsume the eﬀects for educational attainment and socio-demographic background
under the category ∆de at this point since they have the same direction and a similar magnitude.
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values is quite striking. It might suggest that the diﬀerent propensities for owning real estate
in the two parts of Germany are only part of the story. Evidently, other factors such as the
diﬀerent price levels for housing property do play a role as well. From all this we can cautiously
conclude that the diﬀerent home ownership rates seem related to the wealth gap between East
and West Germany. However, the magnitude of the housing eﬀect ∆h is much smaller than the
unconditional summary statistics suggest.
5.4 Results by Cohort
The results presented so far apply to the overall population in both regions. Yet, it is likely that
various groups experienced the German reunification in diﬀerent ways. Individuals who were
younger or not even born at that time might have been aﬀected diﬀerently by the consequences
of this event than older Germans who experienced the disparate cultural and political conditions
in the opposing systems for most of their life.
To examine whether younger Germans diﬀer from their elder countrymen in regard to the
composition of the wealth gap, we conduct a separate analysis with individuals belonging to
households for which no member is older than 45 years, only.17 Of course this cut-oﬀ is somewhat
arbitrary but we examine diﬀerent cut-oﬀ criteria and find that the results are qualitatively
unchanged. We conduct this analysis only for the year 2012 as by that time enough people in
this cohort had reasonable time to build up meaningful net asset positions. Table 19 gives a
detailed account of the aggregate decomposition eﬀects across the distribution while Table 20
presents results for the detailed decomposition for selected summary statistics along with the
share of the overall wealth gap.
Insert Table 19 and Table 20 about here.
The first thing to notice in these tables are the much lower wealth levels found for younger
Germans compared to the overall population. Their mean wealth level in the West, for example,
is less than half the level of the western population as a whole - less than 45,400 e compared to
more than 94,000 e overall. For the East the situation is very similar even if the diﬀerence is
17About 26 % of the sample population fall into this category.
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not as pronounced - the average East German in the younger cohort owns around 27,400 e in
net assets while this figure is about 41,100 e for all East Germans. These lower levels of wealth
can be found at any point in the distribution. Consequently, the wealth gap for the younger
cohort is generally also much lower than for the overall population. For example, the mean
wealth gap for this group is only about 18,000 e - compared to an overall mean wealth gap of
around 53,000 e. These findings are not unexpected as people in the younger cohort simply
had less time to build up assets. For the same reason a much higher share of individuals with
non-positive net worth is found in both regions: more than 26 % of young westerners have no
or negative net assets compared to only about 19 % for all West Germans. Furthermore, the
wealth distribution for young Germans is also very unequally distributed. For example, the Gini
coeﬃcient for young East Germans is 85.47 % while it is only 72.99 % for all easterners.
Another striking finding is that a very high share of the observed wealth gap among young
Germans can be attributed to the composition eﬀect. The mean composition eﬀect, for instance,
is about 12,000 e or 66.23 % of the mean wealth gap for the younger cohort. This stands in
contrast to the corresponding share in the general population which is only 38.74 %. Interest-
ingly, this high explanatory power of the wealth determinants is rather stable along the entire
wealth distribution and does not decline as strong as for the entire population. The covariates
are associated with 81.50 % of the median wealth gap of about 6,700 e and still 67.48 % of the
42,000 e gap at the 90 % quantile.
Two potential reasons for these results come to mind: younger Germans might be better
comparable as they have more similar attitudes and face an identical institutional framework.
Thus, it could be easier to attribute parts of the observed wealth gap to diﬀerences in wealth
determinants. On the other hand, the higher share of ∆x might be due to the fact that at lower
levels of wealth the covariates are generally associated with a larger part of the wealth gap -
as we have seen in Section 5.1. Therefore, one might very well conclude that the large relative
composition eﬀects for the young can simply be ascribed to the smaller size of the wealth gap
at any point in the distribution.
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This argument does not really stand up to scrutiny, however. If we compare wealth gaps
with similar magnitudes, we find that the relative share of ∆x is usually higher for the younger
cohort even at relatively high levels of wealth. Taking the 95 % quantile of the young cohort
as an example, we find that 72.52 % of the 54,650 e gap is attributable to diﬀerences in the
covariates. For the quantitatively similar wealth gap (56,600 e) at the 70 % quantile of the
overall distribution the corresponding share is less than 60 %. As we have seen before, the share
of the mean wealth gap for the overall distribution (53,000 e) was even as low as 38.74 %.
To assess how these large composition eﬀects come about, we examine the eﬀects of each
category as given in Table 20. We find that the eﬀects for the socio-demographic background (
∆d) and the educational attainment ( ∆e) are both positive for individuals in young households
in contrast to the eﬀects for the overall population. This might reflect, among others, that
the educational qualifications of younger Germans are usually directly comparable - something
that is not necessarily the case for older Germans. The contribution of the socio-demographic
background to the wealth gap is usually larger than that of the education level. For the upper
half of the distribution it is even larger than the income eﬀect. However, neither ∆e nor ∆d are
usually significant. The largest eﬀect by far is the contribution of the labor market situation of an
individual. This eﬀect is usually much larger than the eﬀect of permanent income and lies mostly
between 30 % and 40 % of the overall composition eﬀect. This could be due to the fact that
the income distribution is more compressed for younger individuals. Thus, income diﬀerentials
in this group are usually less pronounced than for the population as a whole. Success at the
labor market, on the other hand, is much more important during the early stages of one’s career.
Therefore, times of unemployment, which are much more common among young East Germans,
are likely to have a much more detrimental eﬀect on the financial situation of young adults. The
income eﬀect, while smaller than for the general population, still contributes a substantive share
to the wealth gap and is statistically significant for most parts of the distribution.
All in all, we find that the wealth gap between younger Germans is smaller and more closely
associated with diﬀerentials in the observable characteristics. The labor market situation seems
to play the largest role in this respect.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the gap in net wealth that still exists between East and
West Germany today. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, we can see that
even in 2012, the latest year available, this gap is quite substantial and proportional to the
level of wealth at diﬀerent points of the wealth distribution. By employing decomposition
estimation via reweighting procedures, we find that observable diﬀerences in potential wealth
determinants such as income or labor market situation are associated with varying levels of the
observed wealth gap. We find that for the lower part of the distribution, most of the gap can be
attributed to the wealth determinants. However, that share declines quickly for higher wealth
levels and accounts for only about a third. Moreover, we find that of the four categories of wealth
determinants considered (permanent income, labor market outcomes, education attainment and
socio-demographic background), income diﬀerentials and diﬀerences in labor market situation
are associated with the largest part of the wealth gap. Educational attainment and social
background, on the other hand, have small negative eﬀects - meaning aligning them between
the two parts of the country would even widen the observed gap. This is likely due to factors
which are actually more favorable for East Germany such as its low share of foreign nationals
and its generally higher level of education.
We also scrutinize the role of owner occupied housing wealth in this context. West Germans
have a much higher propensity to own a home compared to their eastern compatriots. As this
type of asset constitutes the largest part of wealth of the average investor, it seems natural to
assume that this diﬀerence in home-ownership rates is partly responsible for the higher level of
wealth in West Germany. We indeed find a sizable eﬀect of home-ownership on the wealth gap.
However, the eﬀect of home-ownership is quantitatively much smaller than those of income or
labor market diﬀerentials. This suggests that other factors, such as the generally lower level of
housing prices in East Germany, play an important role in this regard.
Finally, we ascertain whether younger Germans are aﬀected diﬀerently by the German re-
unification. We find that the younger cohort exhibits much lower wealth diﬀerences than the
overall population. We also find that the relative composition eﬀect is usually much larger than
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the one we found for the entire population. This could simply be due to the smaller magnitude
of the wealth gap in this group as it is generally easier to explain lower levels of debt. However,
we find that similar magnitudes of wealth diﬀerentials are associated with higher shares of the
composition eﬀect compared to the general population. Especially labor market outcomes play a
most important role here, probably because success at the labor market is much more important
at early stages of one’s career.
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A Tables
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Netwealth in Germany
Stats 2002 2007 2012
Mean 76,483 78,689 82,770
p1 -18,040 -20,228 -21,569
p5 -2,519 -3,585 -3,180
p10 0 0 0
p20 263 0 0
p25 2,075 1,730 1,967
p30 4,896 4,069 4,845
p40 12,482 11,871 13,732
p50 28,728 25,605 31,344
p60 52,236 48,356 54,850
p70 80,000 77,230 86,750
p75 96,739 94,733 104,280
p80 118,033 118,140 125,550
p90 192,625 198,051 200,327
p95 289,260 300,000 301,754
p99 601,366 680,727 754,295
% Nonpos. 19.30 20.48 20.23
% Neg. 6.68 8.45 8.55
% Zero 12.62 12.03 11.68
Gini 71.28 73.49 71.92
p75p50 3.37 3.70 3.33
p90p50 6.71 7.74 6.40
p75p25 46.73 55.21 53.03
N 22,813 20,728 18,151
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Table 2: Detailed summary statistics for Netwealth
Netwealth
West East
2002 2007 2012 2002 2007 2012
Mean 87,427 91,671 94,088 36,703 32,233 41,105
p1 -17,033 -20,228 -23,200 -20,673 -20,991 -14,150
p5 -2,331 -3,481 -3,230 -3,113 -3,883 -3,133
p10 0 0 0 0 0 -65
p20 500 119 270 0 0 0
p25 2,617 2,269 2,695 1,010 473 353
p30 5,540 5,065 6,075 2,500 2,014 2,110
p40 16,453 15,842 18,121 5,958 5,860 6,020
p50 38,885 34,208 39,390 12,117 11,287 13,645
p60 64,975 61,382 68,284 22,547 20,483 26,060
p70 93,560 93,384 100,475 38,318 33,416 43,915
p75 111,570 113,612 119,260 47,499 42,281 52,651
p80 135,445 138,399 140,555 58,004 52,081 68,213
p90 213,574 227,970 223,721 99,838 85,456 107,457
p95 322,465 333,063 345,900 144,734 121,341 158,314
p99 658,930 749,185 832,383 285,833 260,600 301,800
% Neg. 6.49 8.23 8.18 7.39 9.23 9.92
% Zero 12.31 11.49 11.03 13.74 13.99 14.07
% Nonpos. 18.80 19.72 19.20 21.13 23.21 23.99
Gini 69.47 71.63 70.51 74.10 74.34 72.99
p75p50 2.87 3.32 3.03 3.92 3.75 3.86
p90p50 5.49 6.67 5.68 8.25 7.58 7.88
p75p25 42.71 50.41 44.45 47.04 89.96 207.89
N 16,956 15,238 13,355 5,857 5,490 4,796
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Table 3: Absolute Wealth Gap
Stats 2002 2007 2012
Mean 50,724 59,438 52,983
p1 3,640 763 -9,050
p5 782 401 -97
p10 0 0 65
p20 500 119 270
p25 1,607 1,796 2,342
p30 3,040 3,051 3,965
p40 10,495 9,981 12,101
p50 26,768 22,921 25,745
p60 42,428 40,898 42,224
p70 55,243 59,968 56,560
p75 64,071 71,331 66,609
p80 77,441 86,318 72,342
p90 113,736 142,514 116,264
p95 177,731 211,722 187,586
p99 373,097 488,585 530,584
% Nonpos. -2.33 -3.49 -4.78
% Neg. -0.90 -0.99 -1.74
% Zero -1.42 -2.50 -3.04
Gini -4.63 -2.71 -2.48
p75p50 -1.05 -0.43 -0.83
p90p50 -2.75 -0.91 -2.20
p75p25 -4.34 -39.55 -163.44
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Table 4: Definition of Wealth Components
Wealth Component Definition
House Own Gross wealth held in the form of owner-occupied real estate
House Other Gross wealth invested in other types of real estate
Financial Wealth Gross wealth held in the form of savings accounts,
bond, stocks and the like
P&I Wealth Gross wealth held in the form of life insurances,
building loan contracts, private pension schemes and the like
Business Wealth Gross wealth held as owner of a commercial enterprise
Tangible Assets Wealth held in tangible form such as gold, jewelery and the like
Gross Wealth Total gross wealth: sum of all above categories
Mortgage Own Mortgage associated with owner-occupied real estate
Mortgage Other Mortgage coupled with other types of real estate wealth
Other Debt Any type of debt that is not a mortgage such as credit card debt
Total Debt Sum of all these debt types
Net House Own Owner-occupied real estate wealth - associated mortgages
Net House Other Other types of real estate wealth - associated mortgages
Total Net Wealth Total gross wealth - total debt
Table 5: Mean Participation Rates
West East
2002 2007 2012 2002 2007 2012
House Own 50.62 48.61 52.15 36.36 36.52 39.67
House Other 14.82 15.45 15.93 10.05 10.53 10.39
Financial Wealth 54.73 58.80 59.10 55.40 55.69 53.63
P&I Insurance 61.16 66.19 64.04 62.03 62.47 62.10
Business Wealth 7.74 7.62 8.18 7.31 6.52 7.44
Tangibe Assets 14.56 10.25 11.47 7.95 6.08 4.80
Mortgage Own 25.41 24.22 24.64 18.74 18.24 17.10
Mortgage Other 6.78 7.04 7.03 2.78 3.74 4.07
Other Debt 17.06 23.70 23.65 20.44 27.14 28.43
N 16,956 15,238 13,355 5,857 5,490 4,796
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Table 6: Mean Gap in Participation Rates by Year
Stats 2002 2007 2012
House Own 14.26 12.09 12.48
Houese Other 4.77 4.91 5.55
Financial Wealth -0.67 3.11 5.48
P&I Wealth -0.87 3.72 1.94
Business Wealth 0.42 1.10 0.74
Tangible Wealth 6.61 4.16 6.66
Mortgage Own 6.68 5.98 7.54
Mortgage Other 4.00 3.30 2.96
Other Debt -3.38 -3.44 -4.77
Table 7: Mean Asset Values
West East
2002 2007 2012 2002 2007 2012
House Own 57,934 56,308 60,680 24,660 21,976 27,188
House Other 17,200 18,515 16,485 4,402 3,357 4,599
Financial Wealth 10,891 13,167 14,542 6,326 6,242 7,708
P&I Wealth 9,718 11,889 10,066 5,160 5,636 6,289
Business Wealth 6,341 7,912 7,904 4,207 3,143 4,232
Tangible Assets 1,534 1,110 1087 824 305 338
Gross Wealth 103,618 108,903 110,763 45,580 40,659 50,354
Mortgage Own 9,567 10,372 10,755 5,357 5,211 5,228
Mortgage Other 4,448 4,407 3,799 1,243 1,188 1,765
Other Debt 2,176 2,453 2,121 2,278 2,028 2,257
Total Debt 16,190 17,232 16,675 8,877 8,426 9,250
Net House Own 48,367 45,937 49,925 19,303 16,765 21,960
Net House Other 12,752 14,108 12,685 3,159 2,169 2,835
Total Net Wealth 87,427 91,671 94,088 36,703 32,233 41,105
N 16,956 15,238 13,355 5,857 5,490 4,796
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Table 8: Mean Gap for Assets by Year
Stats 2002 2007 2012
House Own 33,274 34,332 33,492
House Other 12,798 15,158 11,885
Finanncial Wealth 4,564 6,926 6,834
P&I Wealth 4,557 6,253 3,776
Business Wealth 2,134 4,769 3,672
Tangible Wealth 710 806 749
Gross Wealth 58,038 68,243 60,409
Mortgage Own 4,210 5,161 5,527
Mortgage Other 3,205 3,220 2,035
Other Debt -102 425 -136
Total Debt 7,313 8,805 7,425
Net House Own 29,064 29,171 27,965
Net House Other 9,593 11,938 9,851
Net Wealth 50,724 59,438 52,983
Table 9: Definition of Wealth Determinants
Variable Description
Permanent Income Average per capita net monthly income over the past 5 years
Exp. FT Average household full-time working experience in years
Exp. PT Average household part-time working experience in years
Exp. UE Average household unemployment experience in years
High Job Share of household members with the highest possible job autonomy
Selfemp Share of household members selfemployed
Retired Share of household members retired
Middle Vocation Share of household members with vocational training
High Vocation Share of household members with high level of vocational training
(Abitur + Ausbildung| Meister)
College Share of household members with college degree
Age Average age of household members
Male Share of male household members
Married Share of married household members
Foreign Share of foreign household members
Number of Kids Number of Kids in household
HH Size Household size
Health Problems Share of household members with serious health problems
Father College Share of household members with college educated father
Mother College Share of household members with college educated mother
Ever Inheritance Any household member ever received an inheritance, gift or the like
High Inheritance Any household member received an inheritance or the like of at least 25,000 e
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Table 10: Wealth Determinants Pooled
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Permanent Income 1,306.66 759.6 98 73,363
Exp. Ft 17.78 11.63 0 60
Exp. Pt 2.83 4.54 0 46
Exp. Ue 0.88 1.92 0 37
High Job 0.02 0.11 0 1
Selfemp 0.05 0.18 0 1
Retired 0.27 0.42 0 1
Middle Vocation 0.48 0.41 0 1
High Vocation 0.12 0.27 0 1
College 0.17 0.33 0 1
Years Schooling 11.89 2.34 7 18
Age 49.54 16.78 17 102
Male 0.47 0.29 0 1
Married 0.55 0.45 0 1
Foreign 0.08 0.25 0 1
Number of Kids 0.41 0.79 0 8
HH Size 2.48 1.25 1 13
Health Problems 0.19 0.33 0 1
Father College 0.13 0.34 0 1
Mother College 0.07 0.26 0 1
Ever Inheritance 0.26 0.44 0 1
High Inheritance 0.09 0.28 0 1
N 61,692
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Table 11: Wealth Determinants by Year
Netwealth
West East
2002 2007 2012 2002 2007 2012
Permanent Income 1,342.26 1,361.16 1,374.71 1,123.16 1,081.38 1,153.14
Exp. FT 16.8 17.18 17.59 20.37 19.92 21.03
Exp. PT 2.51 2.98 3.66 1.84 2.09 2.43
Exp. UE 0.58 0.78 0.82 0.98 1.53 1.83
High Job 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
Selfemp 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06
Retired 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.31 0.31 0.32
Middle Vocation 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.51 0.51 0.52
High Vocation 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.12
College 0.13 0.16 0.19 0.21 0.23 0.24
Years Schooling 11.55 11.83 12.08 12.06 12.24 12.46
Age 48.81 49.62 50.87 49.14 49.87 52.17
Male 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.47
Married 0.60 0.56 0.56 0.53 0.49 0.51
Foreign 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.01
Number of Kids 0.50 0.42 0.37 0.39 0.30 0.31
HH Size 2.58 2.50 2.46 2.44 2.34 2.22
Health Problems 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.20
Father College 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.17
Mother College 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14
Ever Inheritance 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.22 0.24 0.24
High Inheritance 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.05
N 16,956 15,238 13,355 5,857 5,490 4,796
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Table 12: Gap for Wealth Determinants
Stats 2002 2007 2012
Permanent Income 221.72 283.07 224.74
Exp. FT -3.52 -2.77 -3.48
Exp. PT 0.69 0.91 1.26
Exp. UE -0.41 -0.76 -1.04
High Job 0.01 0.01 0.01
Selfemp 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Retired -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
Middle Vocation -0.02 -0.03 -0.04
High Vocation 0.02 0.02 0.00
College -0.08 -0.07 -0.06
Years Schooling -0.50 -0.41 -0.38
Age -0.33 -0.29 -1.34
Male -0.01 0.00 0.00
Married 0.07 0.07 0.04
Foreign 0.08 0.09 0.10
Number of Kids 0.12 0.13 0.05
HH Size 0.15 0.16 0.24
Health Problems -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
Father College -0.04 -0.03 -0.03
Mother College -0.05 -0.06 -0.05
Ever Inheritance 0.04 0.04 0.03
High Inheritance 0.06 0.07 0.05
N 22,813 20,728 18,151
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Table 13: Aggregate Decomposition for 2012
Figures in square brackets present the standard error from 500 bootstrap samples.
Stats West Counterfactual East ∆o ∆x ∆w
Mean 94,088.36 73,561.62 41,104.91 52,983.45 20,526.74 32,456.70
[2,770.71] [3,392.33] [2,080.86] [3,640.87] [3,103.96] [4,086.77]
p5 -3,230.00 -3,840.00 -3,132.60 -97.40 610.00 -707.40
[797.82] [965.40] [515.74] [854.52] [839.84] [1,046.70]
p10 0.00 0.00 -65.00 65.00 0.00 65.00
[0.00] [125.72] [271.35] [271.35] [125.72] [326.28]
p20 270.00 0.00 0.00 270.00 270.00 0.00
[228.34] [0.00] [0.00] [228.34] [228.34] [0.00]
p25 2,695.00 0.00 353.00 2,342.00 2,695.00 -353.00
[532.68] [78.71] [430.84] [705.55] [524.60] [440.31]
p30 6,075.00 1,008.00 2,110.00 3,965.00 5,067.00 -1,102.00
[558.39] [402.17] [460.36] [670.86] [595.63] [599.33]
p40 18,121.00 5,978.30 6,020.00 12,101.00 12,142.70 -41.70
[1,825.35] [1,482.44] [690.10] [2,011.26] [1,606.34] [1,659.84]
p50 39,390.00 19,235.00 13,644.67 25,745.33 20,155.00 5,590.33
[1,799.58] [2,722.73] [1,389.83] [2,211.99] [2,611.46] [2,894.33]
p60 68,284.15 43,209.46 26,059.90 42,224.25 25,074.68 17,149.57
[2,982.14] [4,074.19] [2,556.01] [3,551.62] [3,829.47] [4,481.56]
p70 100,475.00 77,750.00 43,914.67 56,560.33 22,725.00 33,835.33
[2,700.19] [5,017.91] [2,431.78] [3,192.46] [4,989.33] [5,084.05]
p75 119,260.00 96,583.34 52,650.80 66,609.20 22,676.67 43,932.54
[3,448.97] [4,072.60] [2,625.04] [4,102.44] [4,474.17] [4,416.52]
p80 140,555.00 117,260.70 68,213.34 72,341.66 23,294.30 49,047.37
[3,217.51] [5,500.54] [4,231.21] [5,022.18] [5,806.80] [6,500.96]
p90 223,720.59 190,030.00 107,456.66 116,263.93 33,690.60 82,573.34
[7,127.75] [8,709.05] [4,002.73] [8,268.28] [10,847.18] [10,014.29]
p95 345,900.00 288,187.00 158,313.59 187,586.41 57,713.00 129,873.40
[15,760.63] [21,033.95] [11,687.56] [21,638.88] [19,943.52] [24,567.28]
Gini 70.51 75.85 72.99 -2.48 -5.34 2.87
[0.85] [1.40] [1.32] [1.73] [1.29] [2.06]
% Neg. 8.18 9.26 9.92 -1.74 -1.08 -0.66
[0.52] [0.98] [0.92] [1.17] [0.82] [1.45]
% Zero 11.03 17.13 14.07 -3.04 -6.10 3.06
[0.40] [1.20] [0.78] [0.87] [1.09] [1.41]
% Nonpos. 19.20 26.38 23.99 -4.78 -7.18 2.39
[0.66] [1.55] [1.22] [1.50] [1.39] [2.08]
p90p50 5.68 9.88 7.88 -2.20 -4.20 2.00
[0.26] [1.46] [0.83] [0.91] [1.37] [1.58]
p75p50 3.03 5.02 3.86 -0.83 -2.00 1.16
[0.11] [0.66] [0.36] [0.35] [0.64] [0.75]
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Table 14: Aggregate Decomposition for 2012
Figures in brackets represent contribution of the respective category to the overall wealth gap
in percent. Figures in square brackets present the standard error from 500 bootstrap samples.
Stats ∆o ∆x ∆w
Mean 52,983.45 20,526.74 32,456.70
(100.00) (38.74) (61.26)
[3,640.87] [3,103.96] [4,086.77]
p25 2,342.00 2,695.00 -353.00
(100.00) (115.07) (-15.07)
[705.55] [524.60] [440.31]
p40 12,101.00 12,142.70 -41.70
(100.00) (100.34) (-0.34)
[2,011.26] [1,606.34] [1,659.84]
p50 25,745.33 20,155.00 5,590.33
(100.00) (78.29) (21.71)
[2,211.99] [2,611.46] [2,894.33]
p60 42,224.25 25,074.68 17,149.57
(100.00) (59.38) (40.62)
[3,551.62] [3,829.47] [4,481.56]
p75 66,609.20 22,676.67 43,932.54
(100.00) (34.04) (65.96)
[4,102.44] [4,474.17] [4,416.52]
p90 116,263.93 33,690.60 82,573.34
(100.00) (28.98) (71.02)
[8,268.28] [10,847.18] [10,014.29]
Gini -2.48 -5.34 2.87
(100.00) (215.80) (-115.80)
[1.73] [1.29] [2.06]
% Nonpos. -4.78 -7.18 2.39
(100.00) (150.03) (-50.03)
[1.50] [1.39] [2.08]




Table 15: Detailed Decomposition for 2012
Figures in square brackets present the standard error from 500 bootstrap samples.
Stats ∆o ∆x ∆y ∆l ∆e ∆d
Mean 52,983.45 20,526.74 16,737.37 10,969.15 -3,193.39 -3,986.39
[3,641.46] [3,124.01] [1,682.63] [2,310.12] [777.17] [1,605.80]
p5 -97.4 610 230.52 472.74 -213.86 120.60
[856.98] [835.00] [309.49] [499.80] [200.08] [346.60]
p10 65 0 7.98 7.98 -3.02 -12.95
[277.04] [109.95] [62.79] [79.49] [22.20] [56.65]
p20 270 270 243.75 243.75 -162.64 -54.86
[228.34] [228.34] [125.55] [121.65] [55.98] [76.67]
p25 2,342.00 2,695.00 1,552.54 1,700.04 -449.1 -108.47
[699.58] [521.57] [294.20] [326.42] [131.59] [194.85]
p30 3,965.00 5,067.00 2,886.19 3,027.65 -786 -60.84
[671.87] [590.34] [383.47] [423.85] [235.05] [339.05]
p40 12,101.00 12,142.70 7,084.70 7,155.04 -1,479.41 -617.63
[2,009.89] [1,625.45] [792.03] [895.82] [398.73] [877.02]
p50 25,745.33 20,155.00 11,714.44 11,918.37 -2,123.47 -1,354.35
[2,226.39] [2,656.81] [1,313.02] [1,713.04] [782.14] [1,504.92]
p60 42,224.25 25,074.68 15,769.21 14,804.70 -2,674.04 -2,825.19
[3,542.90] [3,817.28] [1,933.82] [2,430.84] [974.46] [1,833.45]
p70 56,560.33 22,725.00 15,970.42 13,394.18 -2,572.16 -4,067.44
[3,185.80] [5,026.20] [2,073.12] [2,965.19] [860.20] [1,962.08]
p75 66,609.20 22,676.67 16,800.19 13,378.59 -2,909.23 -4,592.88
[4,118.25] [4,559.43] [2,188.92] [2,640.03] [814.59] [1,999.61]
p80 72,341.66 23,294.30 19,252.04 13,689.38 -3,771.07 -5,876.05
[5,053.53] [5,801.74] [2,688.43] [2,973.63] [1,038.03] [2,386.63]
p90 116,263.93 33,690.60 32,138.25 19,611.41 -6,704.35 -11,354.71
[8,233.45] [10,685.18] [6,513.20] [5,790.39] [2,145.84] [3,598.56]
p95 187,586.41 57,713.00 66,193.47 21,947.80 -13,683.63 -16,744.65
[21,720.59] [19,782.96] [12,824.81] [14,539.63] [4,417.31] [6,990.42]
Gini -2.48 -5.34 -2.13 -3.29 0.41 -0.33
[1.73] [1.27] [0.46] [0.79] [0.18] [0.49]
% Nonpos. -4.78 -7.18 -4.10 -4.22 1.30 -0.16
[1.49] [1.39] [0.49] [0.71] [0.26] [0.54]
% Neg. -1.74 -1.08 -0.65 -1.00 0.20 0.37
[1.19] [0.82] [0.29] [0.39] [0.15] [0.35]
% Zero -3.04 -6.10 -3.45 -3.22 1.11 -0.53
[0.86] [1.08] [0.38] [0.60] [0.20] [0.42]
p75p50 -0.83 -2.00 -1.05 -1.19 0.29 -0.06
[0.35] [0.64] [0.31] [0.35] [0.21] [0.20]
p90p50 -2.20 -4.20 -2.04 -2.50 0.54 -0.20
[0.90] [1.37] [0.70] [0.73] [0.42] [0.43]
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Table 16: Detailed Decomposition for 2012
Figures in brackets represent contribution of the respective category to the overall wealth gap
in percent. Figures in square brackets present the standard error from 500 bootstrap samples.
Stats ∆o ∆x ∆y ∆l ∆e ∆d
Mean 52,983.45 20,526.74 16,737.37 10,969.15 -3,193.39 -3,986.39
(100.00) (38.74) (31.59) (20.70) (-6.03) (-7.52)
[3,641.46] [3,124.01] [1,682.63] [2,310.12] [777.17] [1,605.80]
p25 2,342.00 2,695.00 1,552.54 1,700.04 -449.10 -108.47
(100.00) (115.07) (66.29) (72.59) (-19.18) (-4.63)
[699.58] [521.57] [294.20] [326.42] [131.59] [194.85]
p40 12,101.00 12,142.70 7,084.70 7,155.04 -1,479.41 -617.63
(100.00) (100.34) (58.55) (59.13) (-12.23) (-5.10)
[2,009.89] [1,625.45] [792.03] [895.82] [398.73] [877.02]
p50 25,745.33 20,155.00 11,714.44 11,918.37 -2,123.47 -1,354.35
(100.00) (78.29) (45.50) (46.29) (-8.25) (-5.26)
[2,226.39] [2,656.81] [1,313.02] [1,713.04] [782.14] [1,504.92]
p60 42,224.25 25,074.68 15,769.21 14,804.70 -2,674.04 -2,825.19
(100.00) (59.38) (37.35) (35.06) (-6.33) (-6.69)
[3,542.90] [3,817.28] [1,933.82] [2,430.84] [974.46] [1,833.45]
p75 66,609.20 22,676.67 16,800.19 13,378.59 -2,909.23 -4,592.88
(100.00) (34.04) (25.22) (20.09) (-4.37) (-6.90)
[4,118.25] [4,559.43] [2,188.92] [2,640.03] [814.59] [1,999.61]
p90 116,263.93 33,690.60 32,138.25 19,611.41 -6,704.35 -11,354.71
(100.00) (28.98) (27.64) (16.87) (-5.77) (-9.77)
[8,233.45] [10,685.18] [6,513.20] [5,790.39] [2,145.84] [3,598.56]
Gini -2.48 -5.34 -2.13 -3.29 0.41 -0.33
(100.00) (215.80) (85.95) (132.93) (-16.60) (13.51)
[1.73] [1.27] [0.46] [0.79] [0.18] [0.49]
% Nonpos. -4.78 -7.18 -4.10 -4.22 1.30 -0.16
(100.00) (150.03) (85.80) (88.24) (-27.28) (3.26)
[1.49] [1.39] [0.49] [0.71] [0.26] [0.54]
p90p50 -2.20 -4.20 -2.04 -2.50 0.54 -0.20
(100.00) (191.04) (92.68) (113.55) (-24.47) (9.29)
[0.90] [1.37] [0.70] [0.73] [0.42] [0.43]
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Table 17: Detailed Decomposition including Home-Equity
Figures in brackets represent contribution of the respective category to the overall wealth gap
in percent. Figures in square brackets present the standard error from 500 bootstrap samples.
Stats ∆o ∆x ∆h ∆y ∆l ∆de
Mean 52,983.45 26,145.41 5,459.04 16,514.34 11,031.07 -6,859.05
(100.00) (49.35) (10.30) (31.17) (20.82) (-12.95)
[3,624.02] [3,023.39] [1,053.50] [1,647.20] [2,213.28] [1,835.55]
p25 2,342.00 2,695.00 464.80 1,322.03 1,434.98 -526.81
(100.00) (115.07) (19.85) (56.45) (61.27) (-22.49)
[707.73] [529.53] [139.88] [276.48] [285.34] [215.93]
p40 12,101.00 13,531.60 2,811.16 6,251.38 6,397.57 -1,928.52
(100.00) (111.82) (23.23) (51.66) (52.87) (-15.94)
[2,014.20] [1,565.04] [752.16] [748.59] [850.08] [861.57]
p50 25,745.33 25,135.00 5,970.82 10,996.67 11,298.91 -3,131.40
(100.00) (97.63) (23.19) (42.71) (43.89) (-12.16)
[2,205.81] [2,699.34] [1,369.63] [1,228.99] [1,582.40] [1,432.06]
p60 42,224.25 33,151.02 8,381.66 15,130.73 14,767.71 -5,129.09
(100.00) (78.51) (19.85) (35.83) (34.97) (-12.15)
[3,443.56] [4,407.13] [2,209.51] [1,830.25] [2,174.43] [1,951.61]
p75 66,609.20 30,096.47 7,358.92 16,680.19 13,550.28 -7,492.92
(100.00) (45.18) (11.05) (25.04) (20.34) (-11.25)
[4,101.12] [4,975.14] [1,752.72] [2,161.30] [2,667.79] [2,371.08]
p90 116,263.93 43,240.60 10,175.33 31,043.90 19,640.82 -17,619.45
(100.00) (37.19) (8.75) (26.70) (16.89) (-15.15)
[8,381.46] [10,732.51] [2,689.14] [6,018.20] [5,876.17] [4,209.53]
Gini -2.48 -7.25 -1.74 -2.19 -3.36 0.04
(100.00) (292.90) (70.25) (88.53) (135.86) (-1.73)
[1.73] [1.35] [0.36] [0.48] [0.80] [0.55]
% Nonpos. -4.78 -8.56 -1.27 -4.18 -4.29 1.18
(100.00) (178.92) (26.56) (87.43) (89.59) (-24.66)
[1.51] [1.45] [0.26] [0.50] [0.70] [0.64]
p90p50 -2.20 -7.08 -1.67 -2.57 -3.06 0.22
(100.00) (321.63) (75.72) (116.63) (139.08) (-9.80)
[0.91] [2.74] [0.68] [0.97] [1.07] [0.52]
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Table 18: Decomposition of Home-Equity
Figures in brackets represent contribution of the respective category to the overall wealth gap
in percent. Figures in square brackets present the standard error from 500 bootstrap samples.
Wealth Component ∆o ∆x ∆y ∆l ∆e ∆d
House Own Yes 12.48 10.91 4.09 5.50 -0.22 1.55
(100.00) (87.42) (32.75) (44.09) (-1.79) (12.38)
[1.15] [0.98] [0.43] [0.58] [0.18] [0.53]
Mortgage Own Yes 7.54 8.08 2.64 3.66 -0.22 1.99
(100.00) (107.15) (35.02) (48.58) (-2.91) (26.46)
[0.92] [0.66] [0.33] [0.40] [0.13] [0.37]
House Own 33,492.16 13,397.88 8,932.16 7,307.36 -1,101.31 -1,740.33
(100.00) (40.00) (26.67) (21.82) (-3.29) (-5.20)
[1,398.92] [1,414.67] [886.10] [1,086.64] [398.54] [779.90]
Mortgage Own 5,526.66 4,132.29 1,872.13 2,065.16 -188.04 383.03
(100.00) (74.77) (33.87) (37.37) (-3.40) (6.93)
[527.88] [376.34] [171.42] [261.82] [79.28] [185.68]
Net House Own 27,965.51 9,265.59 7,060.03 5,242.20 -913.27 -2,123.36
(100.00) (33.13) (25.25) (18.75) (-3.27) (-7.59)
[1,273.89] [1,252.29] [817.84] [1,019.74] [341.61] [758.05]
55
Table 19: Aggregate Decomposition for young Cohort
Figures in square brackets present the standard error from 500 bootstrap samples.
Stats West CF East ∆o ∆w ∆x
Mean 45,396.63 33,461.42 27,374.74 18,021.89 6,086.68 11,935.21
[3,521.36] [3,297.91] [3,882.27] [5,191.99] [5,220.59] [3,701.23]
p5 -8,880.00 -7,950.00 -4,980.50 -3,899.50 -2,969.50 -930
[1,084.52] [1,578.14] [1,464.89] [1,835.25] [2,015.07] [1,361.13]
p10 -1,890.60 -2,136.67 -2,094.40 203.8 -42.27 246.07
[637.26] [651.93] [847.03] [1,094.16] [1,035.03] [679.87]
p20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.00] [15.03] [29.85] [29.85] [36.17] [15.03]
p25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 00.00
[65.71] [0.00] [0.00] [65.71] [0.00] [65.71]
p30 990.00 0.00 0.00 990.00 0.00 990.00
[385.25] [101.84] [116.55] [409.91] [154.82] [367.64]
p40 4,770.00 1,600.00 1,325.67 3,444.33 274.33 3,170.00
[729.82] [465.39] [591.98] [974.00] [797.82] [739.06]
p50 10,303.10 4,790.00 3,538.80 6,764.30 1,251.20 5,513.10
[1,430.59] [1,016.68] [979.92] [1,595.25] [1,366.49] [1,530.26]
p60 19,610.00 9,960.00 8,526.40 11,083.60 1,433.60 9,650.00
[2,600.27] [1,546.26] [1,685.86] [3,279.15] [1,982.55] [2,491.34]
p70 36,262.43 20,752.07 19,520.00 16,742.43 1,232.07 15,510.37
[3,668.72] [3,221.71] [4,470.41] [6,117.30] [5,181.28] [3,443.95]
p75 49,926.67 28,773.33 27,570.70 22,355.97 1,202.63 21,153.33
[3,646.96] [4,480.42] [5,922.55] [6,811.98] [6,860.93] [4,401.91]
p80 66,180.30 42,730.00 39,016.67 27,163.63 3,713.33 23,450.30
[4,920.66] [7,085.31] [5,502.07] [6,768.61] [7,858.95] [6,268.20]
p90 121,250.00 92,894.70 79,230.00 42,020.00 13,664.70 28,355.30
[8,021.98] [10,473.16] [12,235.85] [14,686.26] [15,219.66] [8,389.83]
p95 182,200.00 142,570.16 127,550.00 54,650.00 15,020.15 39,629.85
[14,248.95] [15,366.18] [12,803.88] [20,237.74] [20,827.63] [17,037.50]
Gini 82.03 87.92 85.47 -3.44 2.45 -5.88
[2.23] [2.17] [3.70] [4.82] [4.32] [2.14]
% Nonpos. 26.09 31.14 32.31 -6.21 -1.17 -5.05
[1.48] [2.00] [2.73] [3.15] [3.33] [1.86]
% Neg. 14.27 16.03 17.05 -2.78 -1.03 -1.76
[1.28] [1.58] [2.27] [2.65] [2.87] [1.40]
% Zero 11.82 15.11 15.25 -3.43 -0.14 -3.29
[0.82] [1.38] [1.77] [1.95] [2.11] [1.14]
p75p50 4.86 6.03 7.82 -2.97 -1.79 -1.17
[0.63] [1.14] [2.24] [2.17] [2.11] [1.29]
p90p50 11.80 19.53 22.52 -10.72 -2.99 -7.73
[1.58] [4.72] [6.28] [6.09] [8.17] [4.65]
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Table 20: Detailed Decomposition for young Cohort
Figures in brackets represent contribution of the respective category to the overall wealth gap
in percent. Figures in square brackets present the standard error from 500 bootstrap samples.
Stats ∆o ∆x ∆y ∆l ∆e ∆d
Mean 18,021.89 11,935.21 2,413.52 5,668.02 2,190.02 1,663.65
(100.00) (66.23) (13.39) (31.45) (12.15) (9.23)
[5,191.99] [3,701.23] [1,551.84] [2,793.17] [1,091.82] [1,755.42]
p30 990.00 990.00 401.76 527.29 42.16 18.78
(100.00) (100.00) (40.58) (53.26) (4.26) (1.90)
[409.91] [367.64] [149.94] [234.86] [93.77] [180.47]
p40 3,444.33 3,170.00 835.42 1,557.02 261.57 515.99
(100.00) (92.04) (24.25) (45.21) (7.59) (14.98)
[974.00] [739.06] [338.25] [443.80] [247.43] [412.59]
p50 6,764.30 5,513.10 1,427.49 2,473.78 525.09 1,086.74
(100.00) (81.50) (21.10) (36.57) (7.76) (16.07)
[1,595.25] [1,530.26] [505.07] [791.51] [427.85] [694.39]
p60 11,083.60 9,650.00 1,828.27 4,220.20 1,080.75 2,520.78
(100.00) (87.07) (16.50) (38.08) (9.75) (22.74)
[3,279.15] [2,491.34] [701.08] [1,526.97] [691.90] [1,358.05]
p75 22,355.97 21,153.33 3,767.93 8,591.27 3,042.95 5,751.19
(100.00) (94.62) (16.85) (38.43) (13.61) (25.73)
[6,811.98] [4,401.91] [1,361.05] [2,361.74] [1,653.88] [2,934.08]
p90 42,020.00 28,355.30 2,699.77 15,056.86 4,102.68 6,495.99
(100.00) (67.48) (6.42) (35.83) (9.76) (15.46)
[14,686.26] [8,389.83] [2,916.33] [5,727.13] [2,680.92] [4,793.42]
Gini -3.44 -5.88 -1.18 -2.24 -0.63 -1.84
(100.00) (171.17) (34.20) (65.15) (18.19) (53.64)
[4.82] [2.14] [0.68] [1.49] [0.47] [1.20]
% Nonpos. -6.21 -5.05 -2.33 -3.04 -0.09 0.41
(100.00) (81.24) (37.44) (48.93) (1.44) (-6.57)
[3.15] [1.86] [0.63] [1.04] [0.50] [1.13]
p90p50 -10.72 -7.73 -2.69 -3.12 -0.56 -1.36
(100.00) (72.09) (25.14) (29.06) (5.19) (12.70)
[6.09] [4.65] [1.69] [2.13] [0.85] [1.45]
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Table A1: Detailed Decomposition for 2002
Figures in square brackets present the standard error from 500 bootstrap samples.
Stats ∆o ∆w ∆x ∆y ∆l ∆e ∆d
Mean 50,724.50 27,898.04 22,826.46 14,023.30 8,991.29 -1,881.09 1,692.95
[2,670.30] [3,472.72] [2,696.97] [1,420.69] [1,864.32] [619.37] [1,278.84]
p5 782.07 211.03 571.03 408.91 548.75 -504.91 118.29
[707.59] [1,056.22] [822.56] [384.80] [435.49] [291.96] [420.51]
p10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
p20 500.00 0.00 500.00 450.50 340.31 -129.64 -161.17
[172.52] [40.65] [166.78] [199.12] [110.12] [81.62] [109.20]
p25 1,606.67 -549.17 2,155.83 1,834.84 1,038.71 -312.15 -405.57
[415.77] [428.76] [470.39] [295.71] [336.27] [134.52] [233.15]
p30 3,040.00 -226.67 3,266.67 2,582.11 1,570.59 -419.57 -466.47
[623.60] [633.80] [657.76] [305.96] [472.71] [169.21] [400.44]
p40 10,495.00 2,065.95 8,429.05 5,561.17 4,302.81 -826.12 -608.81
[1,437.70] [1,257.56] [1,418.30] [862.96] [1,048.56] [325.60] [609.82]
p50 26,768.20 8,083.30 18,684.90 10,309.01 8,894.04 -621.94 103.79
[2,255.00] [2,858.62] [3,026.99] [1,523.94] [2,132.51] [743.93] [1,257.53]
p60 42,428.18 22,173.33 20,254.85 11,333.79 8,739.19 -1,203.98 1,385.84
[2,181.82] [4,114.06] [3,696.91] [1,863.65] [2,650.44] [777.70] [1,508.55]
p70 55,242.60 34,720.60 20,522.00 12,257.60 8,775.41 -1,981.67 1,470.66
[2,508.32] [4,550.29] [4,018.41] [1,961.13] [2,245.25] [960.33] [1,975.26]
p75 64,071.27 40,617.93 23,453.33 15,194.69 8,801.53 -2,524.50 1,981.62
[3,199.94] [5,183.86] [4,801.77] [2,305.58] [2,577.38] [1,014.19] [2,079.22]
p80 77,440.97 49,045.80 28,395.17 21,468.29 7,858.56 -3,522.60 2,590.92
[3,897.86] [7,047.43] [6,982.75] [3,872.37] [3,960.22] [1,404.77] [2,628.14]
p90 113,735.87 66,868.70 46,867.16 31,014.31 12,622.66 -4,415.93 7,646.11
[5,638.65] [7,599.12] [7,794.05] [4,627.99] [6,068.76] [1,953.67] [3,429.97]
p95 177,730.70 103,470.70 74,260.00 49,234.38 19,292.02 -6,533.96 12,267.56
[10,536.31] [13,860.60] [12,602.80] [9,714.72] [10,619.04] [3,252.75] [5,350.50]
Gini -4.63 -2.02 -2.62 -1.64 -1.35 0.24 0.13
[1.32] [1.56] [1.20] [0.56] [0.70] [0.22] [0.48]
% Nonpos. -2.33 2.64 -4.96 -3.94 -2.05 0.56 0.46
[1.13] [1.60] [1.03] [0.55] [0.67] [0.24] [0.45]
% Neg. -0.9 -0.08 -0.83 -0.4 -0.62 0.26 -0.06
[0.76] [1.06] [0.62] [0.28] [0.37] [0.14] [0.25]
% Zero -1.42 2.71 -4.14 -3.53 -1.43 0.31 0.52
[0.87] [1.29] [0.93] [0.48] [0.61] [0.22] [0.37]
p75p50 -1.05 0.44 -1.49 -0.73 -0.78 -0.03 0.05
[0.41] [0.60] [0.45] [0.21] [0.28] [0.10] [0.13]
p90p50 -2.75 0.01 -2.76 -1.34 -1.65 -0.02 0.25
[0.86] [1.36] [1.04] [0.43] [0.63] [0.19] [0.29]
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Table A2: Detailed Decomposition for 2007
Figures in square brackets present the standard error from 500 bootstrap samples.
Stats ∆o ∆w ∆x ∆y ∆l ∆e ∆d
Mean 59,437.98 33,750.62 25,687.37 18,174.46 10,089.90 -4,083.28 1,506.29
[3,542.45] [3,653.45] [3,393.63] [1,964.12] [2,517.85] [923.53] [1,702.69]
p5 401.3 -577.5 978.8 293.74 1,031.40 131.39 -477.73
[1,105.68] [5,123.75] [4,997.59] [1,457.36] [1,578.16] [1,036.24] [1,331.06]
p10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[67.97] [310.50] [305.64] [101.66] [112.32] [49.73] [60.31]
p20 118.67 0.00 118.67 303.21 287.57 -162.5 -309.61
[232.76] [0.00] [232.76] [179.05] [160.96] [56.44] [109.49]
p25 1,795.70 -473.3 2,269.00 1,723.48 1,620.18 -385.51 -689.15
[585.12] [438.11] [533.71] [289.90] [373.44] [112.96] [212.96]
p30 3,051.00 -186 3,237.00 2,796.66 2,447.96 -707.76 -1,299.85
[522.20] [817.49] [783.61] [362.28] [543.21] [189.09] [356.72]
p40 9,981.37 1,842.83 8,138.53 6,048.08 5,449.13 -1,642.18 -1,716.50
[1,222.31] [1,568.49] [1,583.51] [814.75] [1,035.83] [424.50] [770.68]
p50 22,921.20 8,383.00 14,538.20 9,726.62 8,772.84 -2,819.76 -1,141.49
[2,165.59] [2,613.27] [2,970.61] [1,420.76] [1,772.96] [882.82] [1,121.23]
p60 40,898.46 19,427.95 21,470.52 12,850.93 12,199.63 -3,516.52 -63.53
[2,494.45] [4,126.49] [3,864.14] [1,902.75] [2,323.60] [1,299.11] [1,400.13]
p70 59,968.04 37,250.23 22,717.80 14,897.96 11,967.31 -4,575.24 427.78
[2,970.61] [5,163.48] [4,309.68] [2,266.33] [2,834.80] [1,387.23] [1,810.82]
p75 71,331.44 46,164.43 25,167.00 17,971.98 11,637.37 -5,102.47 660.12
[3,582.86] [6,125.14] [5,582.26] [2,596.32] [3,071.79] [1,135.48] [2,030.26]
p80 86,318.20 57,618.80 28,699.40 21,705.37 10,935.63 -5,379.96 1,438.36
[3,965.31] [6,894.03] [6,226.56] [4,036.00] [3,262.58] [1,672.52] [2,023.27]
p90 142,513.70 95,873.80 46,639.90 36,671.19 13,173.91 -9,609.16 6,403.97
[9,852.27] [14,867.17] [11,139.69] [7,327.62] [5,493.03] [3,197.77] [4,504.10]
p95 211,722.13 134,007.20 77,714.93 55,622.71 19,532.35 -11,287.94 13,847.81
[10,609.94] [19,226.87] [17,880.59] [13,464.97] [11,504.86] [4,038.56] [7,485.90]
Gini -2.71 1.26 -3.97 -1.71 -3.07 0.25 0.56
[1.72] [3.25] [2.78] [1.12] [1.19] [0.39] [0.75]
% Nonpos. -3.49 2.17 -5.66 -4.1 -4.28 0.96 1.76
[1.16] [1.89] [1.72] [0.63] [0.90] [0.29] [0.53]
% Neg. -0.99 -0.54 -0.46 -0.22 -1 0.23 0.53
[0.86] [1.41] [1.32] [0.47] [0.61] [0.20] [0.38]
% Zero -2.5 2.71 -5.21 -3.88 -3.28 0.73 1.23
[0.86] [1.52] [1.26] [0.49] [0.64] [0.23] [0.39]
p75p50 -0.43 0.75 -1.18 -0.75 -0.86 0.21 0.22
[0.34] [0.53] [0.59] [0.26] [0.30] [0.13] [0.15]
p90p50 -0.91 1.65 -2.57 -1.52 -2.14 0.47 0.63
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Figure 5: CDF of Counterfactual Net Wealth in 2012
